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ABSTRACT
This study examined Scottish Highlanders who defended the southern border of British
territory in the North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748). A
framework was established to show how Highlanders were deployed by the English between
1745 and 1815 as a way of eradicating radical Jacobite elements from the Scottish Highlands and
utilizing their supposed natural superiority in combat. The case study of these Highlanders who
fought in Georgia and Florida demonstrated that the English were already employing
Highlanders in a similar fashion in North America during the 1730s and 1740s.
British government sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers
were used to find the common Highlander’s reactions to fighting on this particular frontier of the
Empire. It was discovered that by reading against what these officials wrote and said was the
voice of the Highlander found, in addition to confirming a period of misrepresentation of
Highland manpower in the colony of Georgia during the War of Jenkins’ Ear that adhered to the
analytical framework established.
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INTRODUCTION

There can be no mistaking the integral role Scotland has played in the British armed
services. Scots contributed significantly – whether in manpower for the army or building
valuable ports for the Royal Navy – to the military of Great Britain. Historians who have written
on this subject generally concur that the impact of Scots in the British armed forces was
beneficial and seen in many ways, including the solidification of relations between the nations of
Great Britain. By fighting a common enemy together, i.e., France, it was thought that the Scots,
in particular the Highlanders, lost their Jacobite tendencies (which France supported) and
became fully integrated into the British nation. However, when one looks back at the primary
source material available from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a somewhat different
picture begins to appear. While the complete inclusion of all of Scotland into the British military
did have a positive effect for Great Britain, the actual experiences of Scottish soldiers tell a
different story.
Reviewing the military history of Great Britain from this period shows how the English
took advantage of the new pool of manpower found in Scotland after the ’Forty-Five in their
campaigns against their old enemy, France. Britons may not have completely come together and
fought a common enemy, as some historians claimed. Scottish Highlanders were coerced into
service of Great Britain through conscious means by the English for the expansion and
consolidation of the British Empire. The Highlanders who colonized Georgia in the 1730s were
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part of the martial misappropriation that occurred throughout the eighteenth century in the
British military in part due to the stereotypical notion of the Highlander as suited for the military
colonization demanded in Georgia.

Background

In the years leading up to parliamentary union, the relationship between Scotland and
England was tense at best. 1 Since the Union of Crowns in 1603, there was much debate on how
each country could better from the other. Scotland wanted more share in foreign matters,
particularly trade in newly-acquired territory. 2 James VI and I, the first ruler of a united Scotland
and England under one monarchy, even desired to politically unite the two countries under one
government, each country being equally represented in one parliament. 3 The English, however,
were not as keen to allow more Scottish involvement in imperial matters, and abhorred the idea
of complete union between the two nations. 4
With the triumph of William of Orange (William III) over the House of Stuart and his
ascendance to the throne, there was a sharp increase in mutual hatred and distrust between
Scotland and England. 5 However, according to Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick, the
foundation for parliamentary union in 1707 was laid two decades before when Scottish
1

Murray G. H. Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 28; Christopher A.
Whatley and Derek J. Patrick, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 3.
2
T. C. Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-1900: Proceedings of The British Academy,
vol. 127, ed. T. C. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3; Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 5658.
3
Ibid.
4
Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 4-5.
5
Ibid., 3.
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politicians began talks with William of Orange concerning the new king’s ascension to the
Scottish throne in 1688. 6 The English resented these negotiations, and continued to dominate the
discourse on who had more control in the monarchial union of Scotland and England. 7 The
English saw the Scottish Parliament as a body that could not govern its own people, particularly
the threat posed by Jacobites who desired to restore the Stuart dynasty. Scots wanted a union but
only if both countries were able to participate fairly in the new government, where Scotland
would not be “reduced…to the position of a mere satellite.” 8 Yet Scotland persisted in
attempting to form a political union throughout the troublesome decade of the 1690s when
Scotland was continually made a lesser partner in matters at home and abroad. 9
Anti-Scottish and Anti-English rhetoric increased in the eighteenth century. More
prevalent throughout this century was English xenophobia of Scotland, where Scots were
portrayed as “vermin-like” and barbarous in their manners and lifestyle. 10 Even the Gaelic
language, spoken by as much as one quarter of the population of Scotland at the turn of the
eighteenth century, and other Scots dialects were ridiculed by the English in their attempts to
alienate the Scots. 11 Much of the distrust of the Scots in general was focused on those who
supported the restoration of the House of Stuart, currently residing in exile in Catholic France, a
traditional rival of England and close supporters of the Jacobite cause outside the British Isles. 12
The desire of the Jacobites to see the Stuarts once again on the throne, a divine right in itself
6

Ibid., 5.
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 26-29, 58.
8
Smout, “Introduction,” 3-4.
9
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 26; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 5.
10
Paul Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1603-1900:
Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 127, ed. T.C. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 153, 158;
Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 1.
11
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 45; Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons,” 164-165,
168; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 12-13.
12
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 56.
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according to Jacobite rhetoric, added to a growing English stereotypical view of the Jacobites as
backward and militaristic, longing for the chance to restore the Stuarts by force if necessary. 13
The issue of rule by divine right played perfectly into the anti-Catholic and anti-Episcopalian
propaganda promulgated by the Protestant English after the Glorious Revolution.
The Jacobite cause was backed largely by an increasingly-isolated Episcopalian
population once Presbyterianism returned with the victory of William of Orange after the Battle
of the Boyne in 1690. 14 This shift caused many Episcopalians to feel estranged from the rest of
the Scottish population, including the process of becoming more involved in political activity. 15
This caused many Episcopalians to distrust any union with an English population that saw them
as enemies of the state, demonstrated in the destruction of Episcopalian churches and meeting
houses. 16 The influence of more pro-government Presbyterianism and the Church of England
ostracized the Episcopalian community by associating them with Catholics, and as consorting
with France for a possible invasion of England and restoration of the Stuart dynasty. 17
In the years between William of Orange’s accession to the English and Scottish throne
and full political union in 1707, Scotland and its image suffered tremendously from English
attempts to position itself in a position of dominance over Scotland in the monarchial union. 18
Yet both countries had significant attributes the other desired. 19 Even William III desired a union
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Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 255-256; Whatley
and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 2-3.
14
Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 3.
15
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 27.
16
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 44; John L. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military
Campaigns of 1715 and 1745 (Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh, 2002), 3.
17
Ibid., 104. Pittock asserts that Scottish Presbyterians, while initially associated with Jacobitism, moved farther
away as Episcopalians became more associated with the Jacobite movement.
18
Ibid., 27.
19
Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 5-6.
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of parliaments, a cause taken up by his successor, Queen Anne, in 1702. 20 A political union was
seen as a way to stem the rising threat of French-supported Jacobitism in England and
Scotland. 21 There was a good support base in Scotland for union, but certain acts passed by the
English Parliament, such as the Act of Settlement of 1701 where any future monarch must be
Protestant and adhere to the Church of England, and the Alien Act of 1705 that would have made
Scots foreigners according to the English, hindered progress to such a union. 22 Riots broke out in
towns and cities in Scotland in protest of parliamentary union and English intimidation of the
Scots prior to and after the establishment of a British Parliament in May 1707. 23 In light of these
events, the Scottish Parliament was dissolved and both England and Scotland were ruled under
one governing body with the Act of Union of 1707.
T.C. Smout argues that “parliamentary union did little in the short run for Anglo-Scottish
relations,” and the Scots themselves received little benefit, save for elite in both countries. 24
Despite the afore-mentioned reaction to union in Scotland, the Scots appeared to have accepted
the new government better than the English. 25 There was still a deep mistrust of Scots,
particularly those with Jacobite sympathies that all Scots were thought to have. While not all
Scots harbored nostalgic feelings of a triumphal return of the Stuarts, it was thought they did, and
the English sought to eradicate this wherever possible, whether by pro-Hanoverian propaganda
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Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 4.
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or by armed struggle. 26 In reaction to this, Jacobites residing within Great Britain, including
those in the Scottish Highlands, began to partake in militant resistance to what they saw as
foreign domination of their country.
Between 1713 and 1715, Scottish Ministers of Parliament led a failed petition for more
inclusion of Scotland into some of the politics of the British Parliament. 27 This, coupled with
other attempts at altering, if not dismantling, the political ties between Scotland and England, led
to the out break of the first large-scale Jacobite rebellion in 1715, known as the ’Fifteen. 28 The
’Fifteen was intended to bring together those throughout Scotland disaffected by the new British
Parliament, and not exclusively those who wanted a return of the Stuarts.29 Despite the attempts
of claiming the rebellion would rightfully place a true British monarch to the throne (as opposed
to the Germanic House of Hanover), the Jacobites did not find the support they needed to remove
the Hanoverians. 30 A lack of strong central leadership and poor military planning broke up the
parties associated with the Jacobite cause, and the rebellion was suppressed that same year.
After the ’Fifteen, the British government passed several acts aimed at eliminating the
factors with which the Jacobites were able to form, such as the enactment of measures to disarm
the Highland population. 31 In the Scottish Highlands, there was much animosity amongst the
population who supported the ’Fifteen for the British government, yet this disaffection appeared
to wane after the 1720s; two decades later, Scots who had supported the Jacobites were seen
26

Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 32, 58, 104.
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 32. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 16-17.
28
Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 18-19; Szechi, 1715, 2, 5, 251.
29
Goeffrey Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 17. Plank argues that while many Scottish Highlanders took up arms in
support of the ’Fifteen, the Jacobite army was not entirely composed of them, a stereotypical image developed after
the ’Fifteen and repeated in the ’Forty-Five.
30
Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 48-58; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 17.
31
Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 18. Plank points out that while these measures were somewhat effective, they
were not properly enforced.
27
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celebrating the birthday of King George II. 32 However, as Christopher Whatley and Derek
Patrick argue, one must be aware that this show of loyalty to the Hanoverians and the British
Parliament was not entirely inclusive of all Highlanders; not be until after the last Jacobite
rebellion, the ’Forty-Five, that the Union would be more secure. 33
When Charles Edward Stuart, grandson of James VII and II, called for an overthrow of
the Hanoverians, he believed his family were the only legitimate heirs to the British throne, and
was set on restoring a true British monarchial dynasty for all of Britain. 34 In late July 1745,
Charles Edward landed in Scotland and, with his Jacobite army, began fighting Government
forces as the Jacobites moved south into northern England. 35 Despite victories against
Government troops and Scots loyal to the Hanoverians, the Jacobite army fell back into Scotland,
and in April 1746 were massacred at Culloden Moor. 36 It was at Culloden that Government
forces were awed by the mass charge of the Jacobites, further solidifying the assumed notion of
the Scots Gaels as tenacious warriors suited for frontier warfare in the unstable British colonies.
After the collapse of the Jacobite movement, the British government put into effect severe
reprisals to eradicate the radical Jacobite movement from the Highlands, which included the
banning of cultural objects used by the Highlanders (e.g., bagpipe, kilt), disarmament of clan
militias, and removal of Gaelic from common usage. These measures were felt at all levels of
society in the Scottish Highlands and carried out to ensure that there would be no future threat
emanating from northern Britain. 37

32

Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 368-369.
Ibid.
34
Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 3.
35
Ibid., 1.
36
Ibid.
37
Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 183-188; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 1.
33
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In the decade after the ’Forty-Five, Parliament passed legislation banning the Scottish
Highlanders from owning weapons, wearing tartans, playing traditional Highland music, and
owning land. 38 The enforcing of these laws was taken up early on by Government troops, who,
driven by a “widespread antagonism” of the Scots Gaels, were determined that no rebellion of
that scale happen again. 39 The Scottish Highlands, stereotypically regarded as a tinderbox of
seditious rebellious activity after the ’Fifteen and more so after the ’Forty-Five, were seen as a
backward part of Great Britain, marked by the afore-mentioned cultural elements of its Gaelicspeaking inhabitants. 40 The process of “Anglicizing” the Highlands to become integrated into the
larger British state involved the suppression of the supposed violent tendencies of the Highland
population, accomplished in one way by recruiting Highlanders for policing duties. 41
Unfortunately for the Highlanders, militant Jacobitism became associated with the Scottish
Highlands due to a misconception that Highlanders made up a vast majority of the Jacobite
forces during the uprisings of the early and mid-eighteenth century.
By the 1750s, and particularly so during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), military
service for Highland men presented a excellent opportunity for the British government to
stabilize the rebellious regions in Scotland, while providing an outlet for the Scots Gaels’

38

Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 6.
Ibid., 3-4, 6.
40
Ibid., 3-4, 8.
41
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 109; Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820,”
162; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 10-21. According to Plank, the utilization of the Highland independent
companies to patrol the Highlands “connect[ed] them, politically and economically, to the wider British world.”
These independent companies also participated in road-building projects, designed to connect the Scottish Highlands
with the rest of Great Britain and facilitating the process of assimilation. It should not be forgotten that armed
insurrection was, as Murray Pittock claimed, “an extreme manifestation of Jacobitism rather than a normative one,”
and that this stereotypical image of the Jacobite-sympathizing Scottish Highlander was a construct of eighteenthcentury propaganda by the English as a means of civilizing Scottish Gaeldom by recruiting Highland men on a large
scale for military service abroad. See also, Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero: The Image of the Highlander, 17451830 (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, Ltd. 1995).
39
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supposed inherent martial capabilities. 42 Scots, specifically Highlanders, were in high demand
for military service in the numerous conflicts and conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. The period 1740 to 1815 saw British forces engaged in wars on a global scale. The end
of the ’Forty-Five and the implementation of plans to incorporate the Scottish Highlands into
Great Britain presented the English with a new source of manpower for martial needs. While
there were Highlanders employed by the Hanoverian dynasty before the end of the ’Forty-Five,
such as Forty-Second Regiment of Foot (The Black Watch), many Highlanders did not serve in
the British army until the Seven Years’ War. This war, in addition to the American War of
Independence, the Napoleonic wars, the War of 1812, and the defense of British colonies,
particularly in the Americas, featured significant numbers of Highland soldiers. During these
wars, Scotsmen, Highland and Lowland, made up a significant portion of the British army,
despite being a minority within Great Britain. 43
The same is applicable to what transpired on the border between Spanish Florida and the
colony of Georgia earlier in the eighteenth century. Throughout the North American theater of
the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748), known as the War of Jenkins’ Ear, there were
bitter border disputes between the newly-established British colony of Georgia and Spanish
Florida. Each side claimed territory in Georgia acquired after previous conflicts. The British
continued to spread their influence over more North American territory, and Georgia was
selected for, among other things, the establishment of a strong defensive border on the southern
frontier of British possessions. In doing so, the settlers, most of them Highlanders, were thrust
42

Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 191-192; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 21.
Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 266-268; T. M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire and the Shaping of the Americas 1600-1815
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2003), 313-316.
43
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into an often-times intense guerilla war with the Spanish and their Native American allies.
Colonel William Stephens, secretary for the Board of Trustees of Georgia, described the
loathsome experience of frontier warfare seen by many Highlanders on a daily basis, noting that
“the labouring man no sooner sets his foot [in Georgia]” than he finds himself “entering in some
Branch or other of Military Service.” 44 The Georgia provincial units, principally the Highland
Rangers and the Highland Independent Company, were raised specifically for conducting raids,
countering unconventional warfare tactics practiced by the Spanish and their allies, and
maintaining a constant vigil on the frontier. 45 Those selected to patrol the borders found it
difficult to accomplish due to instances of poor weaponry, inclement weather, and inefficient
supply. 46 The description of the fighting in this region is similar to the style of warfare abhorred
by one of Britain’s most famous commanders, General James Wolfe. Wolfe, a British officer
who served with Government forces during the ’Forty-Five and would later become one of the
more famous generals during the French and Indian War, detested frontier service as “the most
insignificant and unpleasant branch of military operations,” with all who served in a “perpetual
danger of assassination.” 47 Contemporary comments such as these show the true sentiment of
British military personnel in regards to military service on hostile frontiers during this period. It
was this type of frontier warfare that many of the Highland colonists in Georgia faced while
defending the southern border of British North America between 1736 and 1748.

44

William Stephens to Harman Verelst, January 20, 1743, in Allan D. Candler, et. al., ed., The Colonial Records of
the State of Georgia (hereafter identified as CRSG), vol. 24, Original Papers, Correspondence, Trustees, General
Oglethorpe, Others, 1742-1745 (Atlanta: Chas. P. Byrd State Printer, 1915), 207.
45
Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 197.
46
Ibid., 196.
47
Beckles Willson, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London: William Heinemann, 1909), 141.
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Methodology

The period 1740 to 1815 was an important time in Anglo-Scottish relations, one of the
major factors being the suppression of Jacobitism and the total inclusion of the Scottish
Highlands into Great Britain. The domination of the Scottish Highlands allowed for the British
government to employ men from the Highlands for military service on a scale previously unseen.
One of the main foci of this thesis is a case study on the martial experience of Highlanders
serving in Georgia and Florida in the mid-eighteenth century. An analysis of the experiences of
Highlanders who fought the Spanish in Georgia and Florida, defending British possessions, will
build a case for the nascent inquiries into possible martial misuse of Scottish Highlanders by
examining their deployment against Spanish and Spanish-allied forces during the early years of
the War of Jenkins’ Ear and further verify the analyses of historians who demonstrated how
future Highland regiments in the British Army were used in the conflicts that involved Great
Britain in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as well as provide a new military history
to this subject along the lines of what John Shy saw as necessary in placing military history in
the realm of historical scholarship.
In a lecture before the American Historical Association in January 2008, John Shy put
forth a call for military historians, who are on the periphery of historical scholarship, to enter into
debate with non-military historians who have written on military history subjects. 48 Shy argues
that studies of warfare by non-military historians have the potential to be improved if these
48

John Shy, “History and the History of War,” The Journal of Military History 72, 4 (October 2008): 1033-1046.
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historians work with scholars who specialize in studying military history. This thesis is an
attempt to reconcile the “gulf” that has developed between military and other academic
historians to enhance the research on these subjects. 49 Shy’s concept will be part of the analytical
framework developed throughout this thesis.
What is missing from the historiography is a critical analysis of how the British
government martially employed Scottish Highlanders. This thesis, then, explores the two types
of possible exploitation of Scottish Highlanders by the English. The first type examines the
Highlander as employed in the British army in large numbers in order to stabilize the country and
remove any threat to the government and monarchy. The second type analyzes the
misconceptions amongst English military commanders who, through their own praise of the
Highland soldiers on the battlefield, subconsciously accepted the idea of the Scottish
Highlanders as inherently natural warriors, when in reality this was not the case. The issue of
misappropriation of Scottish Highlanders for the expansion and consolidation of the British
Empire has briefly appeared in the secondary literature; there is no comprehensive study arguing
a systematic pattern of such. There are, however, studies on other minority groups from imperial
territories exploited by the English for martial reasons. 50 These studies provide crucial
methodological frameworks in order to demonstrate how minorities within the British Isles were
exploited. The Highlanders fall into this particular category of martial misapplication in part due

49

Ibid., 1034. In his address, John Shy argues: “Military historians…are sure that those colleagues [academic
historians who do not specialize in military history] regard courses and books on military history as not much better
than a form of entertainment, ever popular with students and the general public, but lacking the qualities that foster
serious critical thinking and genuine understanding of the past.” A “gulf” developed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries between military historians and those that wanted to “broaden and deepen historical inquiry,”
leaving the study of warfare in history to certain specialists.
50
See, Carina A. Montgomery, “The Gurkhas and Colonial Knowledge: Habitat, Masculinity, and the Making of a
‘Martial Race,’ c. 1760-1830” (Master’s thesis, University of Calgary, 1998).
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to a stereotypical “martial race” identity applied to the Highlanders by the English. Historians
have debated the impact of Scotland in the British military and the impact military service had on
Scotland, with arguments made for both positive and negative results. There is a noticeable shift
away from analyzing the positive aspects and a focus on bringing out the true nature of the
Highland soldier’s employment in the British armed forces, in some cases negative, and
demonstrating the value of Scotland in securing the British Empire.
The thoughts and comments of the average Scottish soldier serving in the army from
1740 to 1815 are difficult to ascertain. There is a significant lack of primary source material from
Highland soldiers who served in the British army during this time. Many Highland soldiers were
illiterate or could only converse in Gaelic. The exploits of these Highlanders, however, were
recorded by government officials and high-ranking military personnel. Sources such as courtmartial records, battle reports, and casualty lists will be used in order to understand how the
Highland soldier reacted to service in the British armed forces during this period.
What is important to establish in this research is to what extent were Highlanders
misrepresented by the English in the British military. The first chapter of this thesis will be a
survey of the historiography on the martial history of Scottish Highland service in the British
armed forces during the mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. As mentioned above, part
of the framework of this thesis will conform to John Shy’s call for more academic military
history studies that will amend the division between military and non-military studies. This thesis
will expand upon the ideas put forth in the works of Larry Ivers and Anthony Parker, prominent
scholars on colonial Georgia and involvement in the War of Jenkins’ Ear, and tie the experiences
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of the Scottish Highlanders in Georgia to that of the broader issue of how Scottish Highlanders
became integrated into the British armed services from 1740 to 1815.
The second chapter will be dedicated to a general overview of Highland martial
experiences from 1745 to 1815 to provide answers to some of the questions posed above. This
chapter will examine the attitudes of government officials and high-ranking officers on the
employment of Highland soldiers in the British army. Their opinions are important because these
officials and officers actively recruited the Highlanders for military service. By establishing that
there was a pattern of misemployment by the English during this period, one will understand
how the ordeals of the Highlanders who fought on the southern frontier of British territory in
North America fit into this paradigm of service in the British military. An analysis of British
government records, specifically documents from Parliament between the 1730s and 1750s,
demonstrates that certain policies were in place to allow for such practices to occur. From the
perspectives of these elites in British society it becomes clear that the English used lucrative
incentives to persuade high-ranking Scots to actively drain the Highlands (and in some cases,
Lowland areas) of men for service.
The third chapter will be devoted to the case study of the martial exploits of the
Highlanders who defended the southern border of British territory in North America during the
1730s and 1740s. Having established a framework in Chapter Two that shows Highlanders were
exploited by the English between 1745 and 1815, the case study in Chapter Three will
demonstrate that the English were already employing Highlanders in a similar fashion on the
southern frontier of North America. It is here that the common soldier’s views will be most
important. However, as mentioned above, these sources are difficult to locate. Government
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sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers will be used to understand
the conflicts that took place between the British and Spanish in the 1730s and 1740s, as well as a
way of finding the common Highland soldier and his reactions to fighting on this particular
frontier of the Empire.
The fourth chapter of this thesis will evaluate how Highlanders who fought in Georgia
and Florida in the 1730s and 1740s fit a general pattern of misrepresentation by the English. The
purpose here is to develop a framework for future analysis into the theme of the utilization of
Scottish manpower in the British armed services. This conclusion will demonstrate the necessity
of further inquiry into this topic. Altogether, this will show how the English exploited the Scots,
specifically the Highlanders, for the expansion and defense of the Empire. This in turn opens up
new venues of interpretation into this area of research. By establishing the existence of
manipulative practices towards the Highlanders in the British army will the possibility exist for a
proper examination of how Scots were exploited in the Royal Navy. This thesis it is not a
complete study of the Highland experience during the period in question. Only with further
research on later periods in Britain’s military experience and the inclusion of Gaelic sources will
the true experience of Highlanders and Lowlanders, and the extent to which they were exploited
by the English, become known.
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORIOGRAPHY
The historiography of this subject has undergone several developments since the first
published studies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. One of the first major studies on
Scots in the British armed forces was completed by David Stewart of Garth in Sketches of the
Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland. 51 While it served a
purpose as a valuable collection of histories of Highland regiments, including sections on dress,
music, and behavior, twentieth-century scholars rejected the text as inaccurate, arguing the book
is tainted with Romantic-era descriptions that distort the reality of Highland service in the British
army. The rejection of Stewart’s work allowed for more complex arguments to develop,
specifically on topics such as why Scots took up arms in service of Great Britain, post-’FortyFive Rebellion recruitment in the Highlands, and the overall contribution of Scots in defense of
the burgeoning Empire.
The 400th anniversary of the Union of Crowns in 1603 and the 300th anniversary of the
Act of Union of 1707 allowed for a significant re-examination of the complex relationship
between Scotland and England. T.C. Smout published a series of papers from leading scholars on
the Anglo-Scot relations between 1603 and the turn of the twentieth century. 52 There is fresh
debate on the vision of James VII and II, the last Stuart monarch before the Glorious Revolution
of 1688, for an equal representation of Scotland and England under one united government,
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English tolerance (in most cases, a lack thereof) of Scottish participation in Britain after 1707,
and how Scotland contributed to the expanding British Empire. Paul Langford presents an
important critique of the Union of 1707 in his essay, detailing the antagonizing efforts by the
English to assert their dominance, and the Scots their acceptance, in the new British state. 53
Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick made a similar contribution with The Scots and the
Union. 54 Whatley and Patrick discussed the undercurrent of mutual distrust and xenophobic
attitudes developed by both sides prior to and after the Union of 1707. Despite a desire for
political union by Scottish Parliamentarians that would benefit not only Scotland but England as
well, and a display of loyalty amongst many Highlanders who had supported the Jacobite cause,
developed through a loyal service to the British nation during the Seven Years’ War (17561763), there was still a sense of misunderstanding between Scotland and England that would not
be put to rest until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. 55 These works are vital in the
understanding of the intricacies of the Anglo-Scottish relationship within the context of the
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century British armed forces.
There are two general debates within the historiography on the subject of employment of
Scots, specifically Highlanders, in the British army. One centers on how the Scots attained a
sense of “Britishness” after the Act of Union of 1707. The development of a British state, and the
shared efforts of building such a state, including the expansion and consolidation of the Empire,
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allowed for a bond to form between Scotland and England. This bond, according to Linda Colley
and Diana Henderson, was significantly forged on the battlefield. The “British” identity was
formed, in large part, by fighting together for a common idea against a common enemy, France.
The other major debate focuses on the supposed martial identity of the Highland soldier within
the British army, which leads to the investigation of negative aspects of the employment of
Highland soldiers.
There are scholars who believe that the shared military experience of Scotland and
England in wars before and after the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 was one of, if not the
most, important way the nation of Great Britain formed, similar to the bond that appears between
men under the extreme stress of combat.56 The unique style of Highland dress and their
reputation as tenacious warriors aided in bringing public praise for the Scottish soldier and
creating a distinct nationalism amongst the Scots in the British Army. Historians’ arguments
have developed throughout the years on how and when the British army was started, and how the
incorporation of Scotsmen into the English army contributed to the benefit of the individual
nations of Great Britain specifically, and to the British nation in general.
Some historians argue that Scots became apart of an unofficially-recognized “British”
army when serving with English and Welsh officers in foreign armies in the Wars of Religion
raging on the European continent in the seventeenth century up until the English invitation to
William of Orange to overthrow James II. 57 In his 1971 article, “Scotland and the Glorious
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Revolution of 1688,” Robert Paul Barnes looks at Scottish military involvement during the
Williamite wars of the late seventeenth century. Barnes particularly commented on the lack of
understanding of the Scottish role in this conflict. According to Barnes, there were four key
components in unifying Anglo-Scottish efforts to defeat James II: England’s offer to William of
Orange, declaration of intentions, the flight of James II from Scotland, and the military defeat of
James II in England. While the Scottish force sent to back up English troops supported the
monarchy of James II, these four factors contributed to a severe change in loyalty. Barnes argues
that, while fighting together against a common enemy – in this case, James VII and II – Scots
began to feel integrated into a “British” army of English and Welsh troops. 58
In 1987 John Childs published his third and final book on the political and social
history of the army of William III entitled The British Army of William III, 1689-1702.
Childs asserts that English, Irish, and Scottish officers serving abroad in foreign armies
formed a close bond with each other; without this bond, there would have been no solid officer
corps for William to utilize. The experienced officers that served in various armies throughout
the seventeenth century initially came back to serve James II, but could switch loyalties without
much regard. Childs later mentions that William III only trusted those British officers who had
served with him in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade (which was comprised of Dutch, English, and
Scottish troops), and despised those that had served in other European armies. These British
officers, however, gained much experience in fighting in the wars just after the Restoration in
1660, and proved invaluable in the formation of a “British” army. 59
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Published in 2006, The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702 perpetuates the arguments
put forth by Robert Paul Barnes and John Childs. Roger B. Manning states that the creation of
the modern British Army, officially in 1707, could trace its origins to wars in previous years
which involved the English army with elements of Scots and Irish volunteers. 60 Manning further
supports his thesis with the assertion that despite the hostility between the English, Irish, and
Scottish serving abroad in foreign armies, sharing the experience of war, in conjunction with the
idea that they were fighting a common enemy, was crucial for the integration of the English and
Scottish armed forces. 61 Hence, the assimilation of Scottish troops happened before 1707. 62
However, others stress England and Scotland only became a united fighting force with
the Act of Union in 1707. Diana Henderson in particular supported this idea. Henderson
discussed the two debates on the employment of Highlanders in the British military. 63 She agrees
with the idea that military service benefited the Highlander, because it “provided a realistic outlet
for the Highlander’s natural fighting abilities.” 64 Biographies on Scottish commanders reflect
this statement. Paul David Nelson argues that General James Grant had a penchant for fighting
that was conditioned by the environment (Scottish Highlands) he grew up in. 65 The analyses
presented by historians here unfortunately conform to some of the same stereotypical views of
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Highland soldiers as a martial race by offering explanations on individuals or groups of Scots, in
particular Highlanders, demonstrating service in the British armed forces was beneficial not only
for Scots but for the British nation in general. Similarly, there are historians that argue military
service was beneficial for the formation of a “British” nation and national identity.
Linda Colley examined the formation of Great Britain in her work, Britons: Forging the
Nation 1707-1837. It was the shared experience of war and empire-building, Colley argued, in
fighting a common enemy – at the time, France was the major threat – that melded the major
bonds between Scotland and England. 66 Stephen Brumwell, in his social study of the British
army that fought in the Americas during the Seven Years’ War, added to this idea of soldiers
forming a unified national identity that “transcended traditional national rivalries.” 67 While
Brumwell presents a fascinating look at the average British soldier with particular emphasis on
the experiences of the Highland regiments, he weakens his statements by not fully appreciating
the sectional differences between the respective nations of Great Britain. 68 There is no doubt that
Scotland was a key component of the British military in its wars and conquests since the Union
of 1707. However, these general statements misrepresent the true nature of the martial attributes
of Scotland – not to mention the similarities and differences in contribution by Highlanders and
Lowlanders – and the trials and tribulations of Scottish soldiers and sailors in the British armed
services. Nevertheless, these scholarly works have led to additional nuanced interpretations in
the historiography of Scots in the British military. 69
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Scholars such as John M. MacKenzie, Andrew Mackillop, and Hew Strachan, comment
more specifically on the identity of Scots in their military endeavors within the British army. 70
They provide valuable contributions to the debates concerning the myth of a martial heritage that
was imposed on the Highlanders, in addition to how the Scots were able to maintain their
national identity, whether it was traditionally militaristic or not, within the larger identity of
“Britishness.” According to their respective works, the preservation of a national identity was
important for the Highland soldier. Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop argued that the
“emergence of a Highland military image reveals the subtle way in which Scottish consciousness
and popular opinion felt its way towards an extremely effective and comprehensive
accommodation with ‘Britishness.’” 71 What is even more revealing is that, contrary to the
popular myths of the existence of a martial race, Scotland was not seen as very militaristic in
nature. Scotland, specifically the Highlands, was not so much known for their militaristic nature
until the Jacobite uprisings in the eighteenth century. The ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five rebellions did
more to promote the myth of the Highland warrior, including the famous “Highland charge.” 72
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In conjunction with these studies, recent scholarship tends to include negative aspects of
the use of Highland soldiers and their service in the British army. Stana Nenadic argued in a case
study on Highland gentry families and the impact of the British army that military service was
more detrimental that beneficial for these families. 73 T. M. Devine, and to an extent Stephen
Brumwell, discussed the effects of raising so many Highland regiments after the ’Forty-Five. 74
Devine argued that the extent to which Highland soldiers were recruited during the wars of the
mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries led Highland regiments “to be regarded as the
expendable cannon-fodder of the empire.” 75 Such works, published in the last ten years, are
important for establishing how Highland soldiers reacted to service in the British military for the
period of 1745 to 1815, and lay the foundation for a similar argument for Highlanders who
served in militia units on the southern frontier of British-controlled territory in North America
during the first decade of the British colonization of Georgia.
In the case of Highlanders who fought in Georgia and Florida during the War of Jenkins’
Ear, later becoming King George’s War or the War of the Austrian Succession, there are two
prominent works that stand out in the historiography. Larry Ivers in British Drums on the
Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749 discusses the establishment
of Georgia as a yeoman/soldier colony, where settlers would make a living for themselves
without the aid of African slaves, and at the same time be employed as soldiers maintaining a
constant vigilance against threats posed to British possessions. 76 One of the main goals of this
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study is to refute previous notions of General James Oglethorpe and allegations of poor
leadership. 77 Ivers approached his study with an elitist outlook, focusing more attention on the
actions of Oglethorpe and other high-ranking military and civilian officials than incorporating
what the common soldier or militiaman experienced. In light of the “top-down” approach Ivers
presents, this work is essential for laying the foundation for mistreatment of Highlanders by
primarily English officials.
Twenty years later, Anthony Parker analyzed the town of Darien in Georgia and how the
Highland inhabitants contributed to the early development and defense of Georgia in Scottish
Highlanders in Colonial Georgia: The Recruitment, Emigration, and Settlement at Darien, 1735
– 1748. 78 Parker’s account takes a more sympathetic approach to understanding what the
Highlanders experienced while colonizing Georgia. He refutes Ivers’ descriptions of the
Highlanders as being “lazy” and ineffective in during Georgia’s trusteeship. 79 Instead, Parker
argues that the previous English settlers of Georgia failed to establish a colony, and the trustees
for the settlement of Georgia were forced to look elsewhere, ending their search in the Scottish
Highlands because the people there were thought to make both good farmers and soldiers. 80 To
support his argument, Parker integrated descriptions from common Highland civilians in order to
establish the common-person perspective on life in a hostile border colony. Parker’s selfassessment of his work is presented correctly when he asserted that the contribution of the
Highlanders, “out of all proportion to their numbers,” was previously “neglected by most
77
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Georgia histories and relegated to the shadows in others.” 81 Parker is one of the first to focus
solely on the Highlanders and their service in Georgia and Florida. This thesis will build upon
Parker’s analysis, exploring more of the role the Highlanders played in the military campaigns
during the colony’s early years and their response to service in the border conflict with Spanish
Florida.
Concerning the historiography on the Scottish Highland contribution to the establishment
of Georgia, there must be a new military history examination of the Highland militia units that
fought against the Spanish and their allies during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Recent scholarly
discourse demonstrates the Highland soldier’s maintenance of a Scottish national identity despite
serving in a “British” army, deconstruction of the myth of the Highland soldier as an ideal
warrior, and the significance of the Highland contribution to the British military. It is important
to utilize this discourse when applied to the study of Highland militia in Georgia during the early
to mid-eighteenth century. This thesis will close the gap in the historiography by creating a
contextual analysis of how the Highland militiaman reacted to service in Georgia and Florida,
particularly under English officers, while placing this case study within the parameters of a
larger argument for how the British government martially employed Scottish Highlanders.
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CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSITION PERIOD, 1745-1815
The years between the end of the ’Forty-Five and Napoleonic Wars indicates that the
Scottish Highlands and its inhabitants went through a transition period where they became
Anglicized as the English attempted to, in their opinion, civilize the troubled region. Part of this
scheme necessitated the recruitment of Highland men into the British military. This chapter will
explain how the English martially employed the Scottish Highlanders during the period of 1745
to 1815, and will be particularly critical of the Highland experience during the French and Indian
War. The sub-topic in British military studies presented here is important as it details the extent
to which the British went in securing their Empire. This analysis will lay the foundation for how
the Highlanders were deployed by the English for similar purposes during the War of Jenkins’
Ear in Georgia and Florida in the following chapter.

Highland Recruitment

Historians agree that after the ’Forty-Five Highlanders were recruited on a large scale for
service in the British army, and the French and Indian War was the first time a truly British army
would be at war against a common foe. 82 For Scotland, the military was a department of the
82
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Empire open to all. It was also an effective way of removing any lingering Jacobite radicalism
from the Highlands. The pattern of military recruitment in the Highlands is an example of an
attempt by the British government to utilize the Scots for the defense and expansion of the
Empire. One questions why Highlanders enlisted en masse in some cases to fight for a country
that went on a terror campaign to eradicate Jacobite sentiment in their own backyard. They did
so for different reasons, yet in the end, the overall picture points to a cleverly crafted English
campaign to depopulate the Highlands of manpower. 83
Great Britain found herself in the 1750s embroiled in an inter-continental war with their
old adversary, France. There was a great need for men to serve in the ranks of the British army,
and one place that was looked to was Scotland. The end of the ’Forty-Five after the Battle of
Culloden in 1746 allowed for the incorporation of thousands of potential recruits for military
service in the British armed forces. These men were seen by the English as excellent candidates
for military service due to their apparent natural fighting ability. Recruiting drives were
established to engage the Highlanders in the affairs of Great Britain. There appears at this time
(1750s) a major effort to mobilize the new pool of manpower in the Highlands for martial
purposes. What is particularly striking was the method of recruitment exercised by the English.
When one looks carefully at the sources from the time, the English appear to use noble Scots as
puppets; even Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat actively participated in recruitment despite his father’s
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execution after the ‘Forty-Five. 84 The Scottish aristocrats that participated in the rebellion would
be able to gain back their lost titles and lands if they recruited men for the army. 85 The
Highlanders might trust the Scots (most of whom were Lowlanders) over the English recruiters.
Apprehension of Highlanders towards English soldiers and officers after the suppression of the
’Forty-Five was noticeable, and the English saw the opportunity to use the Scottish officers who
wanted to prove their loyalty by having them recruit from the Highlands.
There were many Scots, both Highland and Lowland, who were adamant about proving
their loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty. The English were desirous to take advantage of the new
pool of manpower, and turned to the Scots to recruit men for the British army. Historians have
commented on the incentives for recruiting as many men as possible, including free
commissions, restoration of land and titles, and commuted prison terms. An example of this is
Archibald Macdonell, who was sentenced to death after his participation in the ‘Forty-Five.
Macdonell asked Lord George Beauclerk to release him when “informed there were new levies
to be raised in the Highlands” because he was “willing to spend a Life in His Majesty’s service
in any part of His British Dominions…” 86 Whether Lord Beauclerk felt pity for the man or not,
he commented on Macdonell and others who were in a similar predicament that he would like to
see them sent off “to scalp and have their chance of being scalped…so as not to be a mere
burden for life upon the Government.” 87 It is striking how ambitious some Scots were in trying
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to prove their loyalty. Many prominent Scots took the bait and went on large recruiting drives.
Andrew Mackillop stated that Scots were concerned about their public image, and did their best
to be seen as fervently patriotic to the British cause. A poem entitled, “A New Song,” was one of
many issued in order to get the word out. The poem includes appeals to “Camel’s, Mackenzy’s
Fraser’s and Grant’s/For they are brought up to the Sword,/Such warlike men Lord Loudoun
wants.” 88 Lord Loudoun was the first commander of British forces in North America. A noble
Scotsman, he was particularly active in recruiting Highlanders for military service, and is an
example of the extent to which those Scottish aristocrats that recruited for the British army went
in proving their loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty. 89
Unlike the afore-mentioned “A New Song” that was meant to stir British patriotic
sentiment, there were many other poems and tunes that lamented on the departure of Highlanders
for service in North America. One such piece is entitled, “A Song of Departure, 1757,” and
describes the sailing of the 78th Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders) for duty in North
America: “Terrible the news/As the finest men of our country/Are cheerless and
humiliated/Surrendering their children to you...” 90 This tune allows one to see the culture of the
Highlands affected by the changes incurred from the recruitment of Scots (particularly
Highlanders) into the British army.
The average Highland recruit enlisted for many reasons into an army that had previously
hunted down some of his countrymen, yet the typical Highlander was not warlike as portrayed in
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the past. Recent scholarship is quick to point out that the Highlands were not overflowing with
men of distinct martial tendencies. Historians who have written on the Jacobite rebellions
conclude that of the Highlanders that would see combat in the French and Indian War, only a few
had ever seen combat before. However, the “notions of a Highland warrior were as real as any
identity can be,” according to Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop. 91 Many Highlanders
would enlist because of the lack of opportunities for employment in Scotland, or due to the
devastating effects of a famine that broke out during the mid-1750s. McCulloch argued that
recruiters from the Seventy-Seventh and Seventy-Eighth Regiments of Foot (Montgomery’s and
Fraser’s Highlanders, respectively), were able to round up large numbers of men for service in
the army during this time because of such hardships. 92
Perhaps one of the most alluring enticements offered to Highlanders who would serve in
the King’s forces was the restoration of Highland traditions, particularly the wearing of the kilt.
This is a perfect example of English attempts to draw in the Scots Gaels for their services in the
British armed forces. The Proscription Act of 1746 restricted the everyday use of important
Highland cultural icons (the kilt, the bagpipe), and disarmed the Highlanders, neutralizing any
possible future threat to the security of England. 93 Yet Parliament was quick to make certain
exemptions for the Act, specifically if one served in the army, he would be able to don his
traditional Highland garb. While the prospect of fighting did not seem so attractive to some, the
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allure of being able to dress in their traditional clothing was enough for serving in a government
that had stripped away many of their rights. 94
Forced recruitment of Highlanders in the form of press gangs was a common practice
during this period as well. Ian McCulloch described this process and the Parliamentary Act that
allowed for magistrates to “impress all unemployed men by special degree.” 95 He added a
comment from the time by Lady Ballindalloch that “there is not many spared out of
Inveraven.” 96 Her comment shows the extent of male depopulation in the Highlands during these
recruiting drives. Robert Kirkwood, a Lowlander serving in the 77th Regiment of Foot
(Montgomery’s Highlanders), offered insight into this particular pattern of recruitment.
Kirkwood enlisted in a regiment “composed of impress’d men from the Highlands.” 97 Given
these examples, some kind of effort was made by the English to drain the Highlands of
manpower not only for anti-Jacobite reasons, but also to employ these potentially loyal soldiers
on the frontiers of the Empire. The first such example of mass deployment of Highland infantry
in an integrated British army was in North America against the French and their Native
American allies.
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The Black Watch at Fort Carillon, 1758

The French and Indian War was the American theater of the Seven Years’ War, from
1754-1763. The fighting in the Americas was particularly tough; British forces had to make
critical adjustments in learning how to fight on the American frontier. It took them a while to
organize a strategy that would prove effective for dealing with the French and their Native
American allies. It was in this war that the British were able to draw on the new pool of
manpower found in the Scottish Highlands. The Scots had played a significant role in the British
armed forces, specifically in the Anlgo-Dutch Brigade. 98 However, the French and Indian War
saw for the first time a truly “British” army with the employment of Highlanders. The Highland
regiments would be at the forefront of many campaigns throughout the war, none more
significantly than at the Battle of Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) in 1758.
The British campaign against Fort Carillon in 1758 was one of the major engagements
between the French and British struggling for control of North America. William R. Nester wrote
one of the most recent accounts of the campaign. Nester analyzed in great detail the significance
of the battle. Nester claimed that if the British took the fort when they had the chance, they
would have captured the majority of French forces that stood between the fort and Montreal. If
victory had been achieved, the British would have easily defeated the French in Montreal and
Quebec, perhaps shortening the fighting by as much as two years. This was, however, not to be.

98

See Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702; Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms.

32

The British forces who assaulted Fort Carillon on July 8, 1758 saw one of the biggest and
bloodiest defeats for British troops serving in the Americas throughout the entire war. 99
The British forces, led by Major General James Abercromby, outnumbered the French by
as much as four to one. Under normal circumstances, this would have been enough of an
advantage for victory. However, the French forces under the Marquis de Montcalm utilized a
strategy of rapid fire, an assembly line system where one man fired while a small team of others
behind the shooter would prepare the next musket. Just as the soldier at the front discharged his
musket, another would appear soon afterwards. The French were able to loose six aimed shots
per minute onto the advancing British in this manner. This tactic proved devastating for the
British forces who expected the normal two to three shots per minute from the defenders of Fort
Carillon. In tandem with the effects of the rapid fire from the French, Abercromby had his men
attack in line-of-battle, where infantry are deployed in long, rectangular ranks so as to present a
wall of fire when fighting an opponent. Historians, and British officers at the time, concluded
that this was a major mistake. With hindsight on his side, Nester argued that Abercromby should
have attacked the fort using column (maneuver) formation, rather than line-of-battle. The column
formation would have allowed the British forces to better negotiate the many obstacles that they
met while maneuvering through the woods and difficult terrain in front of Fort Carillon,
including the defenses thrown up before the fort. 100
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While engaged in fighting at the fort, the 42nd Regiment of Foot (Black Watch) would
attack time and again, battling the French for over three hours before finally heeding the call for
retreat, which was issued around 2:30 p.m. 101 Montcalm himself praised the Highlanders in their
attacks while other British regular regiments fell back, where he commented that the “Scottish
Highlanders returned unceasingly to the attack, without becoming discouraged or broken.” 102
The Black Watch suffered tremendously as a result of its vain efforts to dislodge the French at
Fort Carillon. Of the 1,000 Highlanders of the Black Watch that participated in the assault, 648
were casualties (315 killed, 333 wounded). 103 The percentage of casualties suffered by the
Highlanders, almost sixty-five per cent, is unheard of in warfare at this time. No other regiment,
on either side, suffered such high casualties after one battle as the Black Watch did at Fort
Carillon. In addition to the devastatingly high numbers, the disparity between dead and wounded
is another shock. In most battles from this period in history, there is a larger gap between the
numbers of dead and wounded suffered by a unit in battle, with the number of dead being
relatively less that the amount of wounded. It is still not known exactly why the Black Watch
ignored orders to fall back with the rest of the regular forces when Abercromby ordered them to.
Regardless, the Highlanders paid a tremendous price that day for an empire that thought of them
as expendable.
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The Relief of Fort Pitt: The Battle of Bushy Run, 1763

Many of the Highlanders served on the exposed frontier in North America, far in advance
of the main body. James Wolfe, a prominent general in the British army, described the drudgery
of serving on frontier duty as “the most insignificant and unpleasant branch of military
operations,” with all who served in a “perpetual danger of assassination.” 104 Shortly after the end
of the French and Indian War, an uprising of Native Americans occurred, known as Pontiac’s
Rebellion, which threatened the frontiers of the British-controlled colonies in North America.
Once again, the Highlanders played a crucial role in defending the Empire. The fighting done by
the Highlanders during this rebellion fit into the reasons why Highland regiments were deployed
by the English in this region. Examples of the Highland charge, of Highlanders stereotypically
seen behaving like savages – or being used because they were thought to behave like savages –
and the belief that the Highland soldier was accustomed to fighting on difficult terrain under
undesirable conditions, are seen in this rebellion.
One of, if not the major turning point of Pontiac’s Rebellion was the Battle of Bushy
Run. David Dixon commented on the significance of this battle in Never Come to Peace Again:
Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America. Dixon credited this
battle as not completely ending the Indians’ ability to fight, yet it did put an end to the siege of
Fort Pitt. Dixon stated that the fall of this important outpost “would have allowed [the Indians] to
continue the war for a longer period,” with the added bonus of “an important psychological and
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spiritual impetus.” 105 The prevention of the fall of Fort Pitt allowed for the reopening of
communication links between the frontier and Philadelphia, a vital aspect for the possibility of
additional military campaigns or expansion of British control in the western regions of Britishcontrolled North America.
The Highlanders made up a significant portion of the column advancing to the relief of
Fort Pitt in July and August of 1763. Of the 465 men who accompanied Colonel Henry Bouquet
on the campaign, 390 were Highlanders, the rest being trained riflemen and wagon drivers. 106
Once again, Highlanders were being sent out on frontier duty, exposing themselves, as James
Wolfe lamented doing years before while in service in the Highlands during the ‘Forty-Five, and
privy to ambush and assassination. The terrain of where the battle took place was “commanded
by high and craggy Hills,” and the path to be taken by the Highlanders was suspected by
Bouquet to be the perfect place for an ambush to occur. 107 This area, according to popular
opinion at the time, especially that of the English, should have been perfect for the Highlander,
who was supposed to be adept to fighting in this terrain. In addition, the apparent use of the
Highlanders as the advance guard of the expedition should perhaps come as no surprise. Their
deployment as the lead group in this column is evidence of their supposed capability for fighting
in this kind of terrain, and is another example of the Highlanders manipulated by the English for
the greater good of the British expedition. 108

105

David Dixon, Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North
America (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 197.
106
McCulloch, Sons of the Mountains, 302.
107
Letter of Colonel Bouquet to Amherst, August 5, 1763; quoted from full-text letter in Dixon, Never Come to
Peace Again, 277.
108
Dixon, Never Come to Peace Again, 186.

36

The fighting was particularly fierce. Dixon argued that the Highlanders could only keep
the Indian attackers at bay by making bayonet charges to force the Indians back into the woods.
Robert Kirkwood described the trap set for the Indians: “…having made a kind of breastwork
with the flour bags, [we] waited their approach; when they came close up, we gave them our
whole fire, and rushed out upon them with fixt bayonets; the Indians…took to their heels, and
left the field of battle.” 109 The images of Highlanders attacking with broadsword and musket and
laying waste to whomever was in their way as described in the primary and secondary material
available on this battle show how this is similar to what Government forces encountered during
the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five uprisings. 110 Colonel Bouquet commented on the severity of the
fighting, where the Indians “resolutely returned Fire, but could not Stand the irresistible Shock of
our Men, who rushing in among them, killed many of them.” 111 This and the other charges made
by the Highlanders confirm the afore-mentioned tactics the Jacobites used during the ‘Fifteen
and ’Forty-Five rebellions, particularly the devastating charge during the Battle of Culloden.
The Battle of Bushy Run, while not a particularly bloody engagement as compared to the
slaughter pen of Ticonderoga five years before, was still an important engagement in the history
of the British military, and more specifically the history of Scottish influence in the British
armed forces. Dixon credited this victory as perhaps the “most complete victory” of British
forces over Native Americans. 112 It should not be lost on the minds of historians the significance
of the stereotypical Highland warrior images that come out of this battle. The Highlanders that
participated in Bushy Run are depicted as charging multiple times at the enemy, each time with
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bayonets and broadswords at the ready. All these characteristics are similar to reasons why, at
least in the opinions of the English, the Highlanders would be perfect candidates for defending
the Empire against her enemies.

The Peninsular Campaign

Instances of martial misappropriation are not confined to the eighteenth century. The
threat of radical revolutionary ideas from France and the conquests of Napoleon on the European
continent caused patriotic fervor to reach a high in the early years of the nineteenth century in
Britain. 113 As a result, the British armed forces expanded exponentially, and one of the areas
most affected was Scotland, specifically the Highlands. 114 During this time, more Highland
regiments were raised than at any point previous in British military history. An anonymous
memoir of a soldier in the 71st Highland Light Infantry details the story of this regiment and their
involvement in campaigns during the Napoleonic Wars. 115 This text serves as an example of the
involvement of Highlanders in the British armed services during the disastrous British operation
in Argentina in 1806 to 1807 and the vicious fighting on the Iberian Peninsula between 1808 and
1814.
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While on campaign in South America, the Seventy-First encountered extreme weather
conditions, excessive fatigue while marching long distances, and abnormal battle orders. The
anonymous soldier described how he and his regiment were forced to work around the clock
constructing fortifications while laboring in oppressive heat. 116 The author detailed one particular
battle in July 1807, when his regiment was ordered to attack a town at bayonet point with empty
muskets. The enlisted men were taken aback by this order, commenting to one another, “We are
betrayed.” 117 From this assessment, the Highlanders were deployed as they would be in the
stereotypical “Highland charge” manner, with muskets replacing broadswords and targets. 118
Overall, the campaign in South America saw few British victories and many set-backs, such as
the ill-fated assault by General John Whitelocke on Buenos Aires in July 1807. 119
The British faced a formidable enemy once they joined the Portuguese on the Iberian
Peninsula. However, the campaign season of 1808 proved better for the British and allied forces
than what was originally expected. In August the French were turned back at the Battle of
Vimeiro. It was here that the Seventy-First, while protecting a few artillery pieces captured
during the battle, came under attack by French cavalry. 120 The winter of 1808-1809 was
particularly harsh for the soldiers in the Seventy-First. The Highlander experienced heavy
downpours of rain, bitter cold, and gnawing hunger. Many shared the author’s sentiment when
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he stated that “this was the most dreadful period of my life.” 121 Donald McDonald, the author’s
friend in the regiment, sobbed at the idea that he would never again see Scotland. 122 Images such
as these are problematic for scholars who believe that war was a unifying experience for the
nations of Great Britain.
Between the campaigns for Lisbon and Fuentes de Oñoro in 1810-1811, the Seventy-First
yet again met with demanding conditions on the battlefield while facing adverse weather and
terrain. In October 1810, the regiment, deployed as skirmishers, fought French elements in and
around the village of Sobral while the rest of the advance guard fell back. 123 The Highlanders, at
first driven out of the barricades they erected, re-formed and pursued the French through the
village and beyond, skirmishing with French elements for several days. 124 The Seventy-First was
so far in advance they had trouble receiving supplies, going without even basic food such as
bread. 125 The men of the Seventy-First were, according to the author, forced to forage or face
starvation. The regiment finally halted their pursuit until supply wagons reached them. During
the three-day battle of Fuentes de Oñoro in 1811, a battalion of the 71st, along with a battalion of
the 24th Regiment of Foot and 79th Regiment of Foot (Cameron Highlanders) were thrown into
one of the most important spots on the battlefield, a village near Fuentes de Oñoro, suffering
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over four hundred casualties; the regiment was reduced to an effective fighting strength of less
than two hundred officers and enlisted men. 126
The fighting continued to rage in Spain between the latter months of 1811 through 1813,
the British and Spanish forces slowly forcing the French out of the Iberian peninsula. During the
battle of Almaraz in May 1812, the Seventy-First, along with elements of the 50th Regiment of
Foot, were ordered to take a heavily-defended fort on the opposite bank of the Tagus River. The
taking of the fort, and the subsequent retreat of the French and destruction of their bridge by the
British, cut the main line of communications between the French commanders in the region,
Marshals Nicolas Soult and Auguste Marmont. 127 An anonymous soldier of the Seventy-First,
while on duty one evening, discovered some Highlanders singing: “Why did I leave my Jeanie,
my daddy’s cot, an’ a’,/To wander from my country, sweet Caledonia.” 128 The song, according
to the author, is one of “Scotland’s sweetest songs of remembrance.” 129 The Highlanders appear
to lament their current state by singing nationalistic songs of Scotland, not of Great Britain. The
singing of this counters the arguments made by historians who believe the sense of “Britishness”
was forged on the battlefield.
While pursuing the French across the Pyrenees during the campaigns of 1813 to 1814, the
Seventy-First saw some of the worst fighting, including the action at Vittoria on June 21, 1813.
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Heading the initial advance were battalions of the Seventy-First, 50th Regiment of Foot, and 92nd
Regiment of Foot (Gordon Highlanders) under command of Colonel Henry Cadogan. 130 The
Seventy-First bore the brunt of withering French fire as they tried to negotiate a ravine near
Zumelzu. 131 It was at this battle that the regiment suffered the most out of the entire Allied force
engaged, where they incurred over three hundred casualties, including their commanding
officer. 132
The plight of the 71st Highland Light Infantry is indicative of the way other Highland
regiments in the British army were used in previous conflicts. In battle after battle, the 71st was
thrust into the most savage of fighting, as seen in major engagements at Vimeiro, Fuentes de
Oñoro, and Vittoria, and at comparatively minor battles at Sobral and Almaraz. Despite the fact
that the Seventy-First was a light company, and would have been placed in front during opening
movements on the battlefield, the extreme situations these Highlanders were under, whether
battling the elements or fighting in seemingly impossible situations, suggests that the English,
seeing the Highlanders through the English-constructed stereotypical lens of the Highlander’s
natural martial capabilities, deployed the Seventy-First in a manner conducive to what was
expected of the Highlanders at this time. 133 The American defeat of British forces at the Battle of
New Orleans at the close of the War of 1812 confirms this notion upon examination of how the
93rd Regiment of Foot (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) was employed in this engagement.
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The Battle of New Orleans

The War of 1812 (1812-1814) provides another setting to examine the strains Highland
forces were under when fighting for the British nation. This section will focus on the attack by
the 93rd Regiment of Foot (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) on American forces outside New
Orleans. The battle, and the role the Ninety-Third played, demonstrates the martial
misappropriation of Scottish Highlanders by English officers in battle. The 93rd Highland
Regiment became one of the last British regiments to suffer, perhaps needlessly, at the Battle of
New Orleans, the last major engagement of the war.
In preparation for the attack on the southern United States, the British built up a strong
force of nearly 10,000 men, including the Ninety-Third which sailed from Plymouth to the West
Indies in September 1814. 134 By late November 1814, an invasion force of fifty ships set sail for
United States territory; by now the American forces were well-aware of British intentions, and
began assembling their forces near the anticipated British landing site. 135 Once the British
landed, the race was on to New Orleans. Several days of skirmishing between American and
British forces in late December precipitated the major engagement, allowing the Americans to
improve their defenses outside the city. In almost every engagement, the British failed to assess
their dominant position over the Americans, and the numerically-inferior American forces fell
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back and re-organized. 136 By January 1, 1815 the British artillery was in position to commence
the bombardment of the main American positions.
The British plan was to feign an assault on the American right flank while the main attack
would come at the other end of the line, the British moving through swamps to surprise the
American defenders. Colonel William Thornton was to lead several companies of infantry in the
main assault during the night of January 7-8, but he did not begin moving troops until well after
the designated start time; the element of surprise was lost.137 The movement of Thornton’s men
dictated how General John Keane’s brigade, consisting of the 93rd and 95th Regiments, would be
used in the engagement. 138 If Thornton achieved success against the Americans, Keane would
assist in drawing American attention away from Thornton so the breach could be further
exploited. Despite a late start in his assault, Thornton was able to drive back the defenders and
create a significant threat to the American position. 139 However, the attack on the American right
flank began to falter, posing a risk to the opposite flank, and Thornton began a retreat back to the
British lines. 140
The attack by the British left flank now became the focal point with the failure of
Thornton. British skirmishers, made up of light companies of Keane’s and Colonel Robert
Rennie’s columns, reached the American lines first with ladders. 141 After a fierce fight, the
British light companies were driven back. The main British thrust now commenced on the
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American lines. The 93rd Regiment moved obliquely across the battlefield, supporting General
Samuel Gibbs, drawing heavy fire from the Americans who used five rotating ranks of musket
fire provided by the infantry and devastating grape shot by the artillery to obliterate the
Highlanders as they moved across the battlefield. 142 Despite the loss of over half of the men in
the Ninety-Third, Keane decided to press on with the attack. Those that did approach near the
American lines became bogged down in a canal, where a steady fire ended any hope of British
success. 143 To the horror of the officers and men in the Ninety-Third, Keane ordered the
regiment to halt and take what cover they could find while the British attempted to regroup and
attempt another push towards the American defenses. 144 Realizing the American position was
impregnable, General Sir John Lambert, acting commander of the British force for the mortallywounded Packenham, ordered a retreat. 145
According to Donald R. Hickey, the Battle of New Orleans on January 8 was “the most
lopsided engagement of the war.” 146 The battle was particularly harsh for the 93rd Highlanders,
who suffered 545 casualties; this equates to just over one quarter of the entire casualty figures for
the British. 147 The Highlanders appeared to be confused during the latter stages of the battle, and
with the loss of so many officers, fifteen commissioned and over twenty non-commissioned, the
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regiment lost cohesion and began to falter. 148One wonders why Keane ordered the Highlanders
to continue their attack when so many officers were down.
The Ninety-Third already made an impression on its brigade commander, Keane, despite
being formed a just over a decade before and not seeing much combat. According to Charles
Brooks, the regiment, formed in response to the threat France posed to Europe in 1803,
pleasantly surprised the English officers in the field and in Britain, as well as politicians in
Parliament. 149 If the 93rd Regiment lacked experience on the battlefield, why was the regiment
praised at this stage in their development? According to John MacKenzie, Highland clothing,
notably the kilt, became the standard dress for nearly all Scottish regiments serving the British
army. 150 The Highland regiments raised after the ’Forty-Five were a construct of the English
who wanted the men in these regiments to wear the typical iconic clothing associated with the
Highlands, its inhabitants thought of as militaristic by birth. 151 The English wanted the Scottish
soldier to appear strong and tenacious in battle; to achieve this they fashioned the new regiments
in the manner of the stereotypical Highland warrior. In the case of the attack on American
positions at New Orleans, the Highlanders of the Ninety-Third were perhaps thought of by their
English officers as capable of completing the task at hand, regardless of the lack of officers to
maintain stability within the faltering ranks.
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Opinion of Highlanders: Perspectives from English Generals and Politicians

After the end of the last Jacobite rising in 1746 and the extinguishing of virtually
any Jacobite sentiment in the Scottish Highlands, Scots began to play a more important
role in the British army. Studies on the impact of Scots in the British army prior to 1746
have analyzed how Scottish officers gained experience by serving in foreign armies
in Europe. However, most of these officers were Lowlanders. The inclusion of the Highlands
after the ’Forty-Five allowed for a fully integrated Scottish officer corps in the British army. The
Lowlander officer was highly sought after due to his sophisticated martial education abroad; the
Highlander was sought after for several reasons, including his own military experience and the
added benefit (for the English) of the removal of possible Jacobite leadership. In the years after
the ’Forty-Five more and more Scottish regiments, particularly Highland ones, began to appear
in the British army. The total incorporation of the Highlands into Great Britain offered the
British army a new pool of manpower from which to draw on. This was also one of the most
important times for post-Jacobite Scotland and her relations with England.
James Wolfe, future commander of the British expedition against the French at Quebec
during the French and Indian War, stated very strongly his feelings on Highlanders, and did so
on more than one occasion. In one piece of correspondence, he lectured a friend on the qualities
of the Highlander: “[The Highlanders] are hardy, intrepid, accustomed to a rough country, and
no great mischief if they fall.” 152 Wolfe’s opinion here, a few years after his service during the
‘Forty-Five, is an example not only of the Scotophobia that appeared during the eighteenth
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century in England, but also the opinion of some who thought that the Highlanders inherently
suitable for combat. 153 Historian Hew Strachan examined a similar statement in regards to
Wolfe’s thoughts on the Highlanders. He quotes James Wolfe asking in 1751: “‘How can you
better employ a secret enemy than by making his end conducive to the common good?’” 154 The
quote from Wolfe and Strachan’s subsequent comments indicate that Wolfe was also of the
opinion that by draining the Highlands of its male population and putting them into the British
armed forces, the opportunity for any further Jacobite insurgency would diminish. These
comments by Wolfe are excellent examples of the desire to take advantage of the Highlanders,
not to mention common stereotypical English views of the Highlanders.
British politicians, while sometimes using somewhat softer language, still conveyed a
sense of necessity for the use of Highlanders in military service in their speeches in and out of
Parliament. William Pitt desired to get his thoughts out for posterity, perhaps in order to preserve
his place in history as, according to him, one of the few Englishmen at the time to comment
positively on the employment of Highlanders in the British army. Pitt commented in 1766 on the
decision to use Highlanders: “I sought merit wherever it could be found; it is my boast that I was
the first minister who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the north. I called it forth and
drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of young men…[who] fought with valour and
conquered for you in every part of the world.” 155 Pitt praised the Highlanders on their service
during the French and Indian War in his address, citing their defense of British territories abroad.
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However, his speech could be construed as justifying the propaganda used to recruit the
Highlanders.
In 1750 the Secretary of War, Lord Barrington, announced to Parliament his desire to
incorporate “as many Scottish soldiers in the army as possible” but made note of his preference
for “as many Highlanders as possible.” 156 Lord Barrington’s statement came at a time when the
English were realizing the potential “benefits” of employing the Highlanders in the British army.
These included, as James Wolfe stated a year earlier, the elimination of any possible Jacobite
threats, while utilizing a new source of manpower for defending the Empire at home and
abroad. 157 Lord Barrington concurred with the idea that Highlanders were perfect for service
abroad, as, in his opinion, they were accustomed to living tough lives.
Charles, 3rd Duke of Richmond, expressed his feelings on the intermingling of Scots and
English officers in the British army in a letter to his brother in 1757. The Duke expressed his
sorrow at his brother’s wish to join an all-Highland regiment when he asked why he would want
to serve in a regiment that is “commanded and composed of rebels?” The Duke continued his
tirade by ordering his brother to “drop…[his] fondness for the Scotch in general….[and] do not
choose among them your friends. It can never do you any honour and may be of disservice to
you.” 158 The Duke of Richmond’s comments demonstrate the severe disdain some English
politicians had of the Scots, especially after the ‘Forty-Five.
Louis Antoine de Bougainville, who was standing near Montcalm where the Highlanders
assaulted Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) in July 1758, revealed later his thoughts on the
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service of Highlanders in the British army. Bougainville claimed after the battle that the
Highlanders who were deployed against the French “understand very well they are sent to
America in great numbers by the British in order to depopulate their lands and even hopes of
seeing some of them killed.” 159 It seems as though Bougainville may have been correct in his
observations. The Highlanders suffered more casualties than any other British unit there, and
Bougainville’s commentary highlights some of the sentiment of English politicians and officers
on post-’Forty-Five Highlanders.

Conclusion

In the wake of the last Jacobite rebellion, the Scots, particularly the Highlanders, played a
significant role in the British army. Before the ’Forty-Five some Scottish officers joined other
officers from Great Britain in serving abroad in foreign armies to gain experience. These officers
were sought after for the training they received. However, the antipathy for which the English
held the Scots after the ’Forty-Five is reflected in the manner in which the Highlanders were
recruited, where they fought, and the general opinions of influential English officers and
politicians.
Highlanders did enlist on their own accord in some cases, yet many were also pressed
into service, as is seen in the 77th Regiment of Foot (Montgomery’s Highlanders). The English
took advantage of those Highlanders who wanted their lands and titles restored after the ’FortyFive, or those not involved with the Jacobites but seeking to prove their loyalty to the
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Hanoverian dynasty, to recruit men for military service. The English took advantage of the
Highlanders who wished to have returned to them cultural aspects, such as the kilt and bagpipe,
which Parliament took away with the Proscription Act of 1746. The only place where
Highlanders could use these and other treasured items was in the army. For the English, draining
the Highlands of any lingering Jacobite threat was an important factor in deciding to employ
large numbers of Highlanders into the British armed services.
The French and Indian War was the first conflict where a truly “British” army fought
together, one that included Scottish Highland regiments. These regiments, some composed of
men who were pressed into service or lured by the promise of the ability to wear their tartans,
saw some of the fiercest fighting in the American theater. The Black Watch suffered nearly
sixty-five per cent casualties during the attack on Fort Carillon, a casualty rate unheard of at the
time. The Highlanders who accompanied Colonel Henry Bouquet to relieve Fort Pitt in 1763
experienced the type of warfare the English thought the Highlanders were accustomed to. These
Highlanders fought on the frontier, exposed to all its dangers, a duty lamented by General James
Wolfe. Fort Carillon and Bushy Run are only two battles from this conflict that exemplify the
extent of the misunderstanding of Scots Gaels as natural warriors as a result of English demands
for more men for the British army.
The beginning of the nineteenth century saw Highland regiments raised on an
unprecedented scale. Yet, the manner in which these regiments were deployed did not change.
As demonstrated by the experiences of the 71st Highland Light Infantry during the Peninsular
campaign and the 93rd Regiment of Foot (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) at New Orleans,
the English commanders on the battlefield continued to use the Highlanders as the English
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thought they should be used. This included mass charges with empty muskets (a symbol of the
“Highland charge,” where muskets substituted broadswords and targets), based on the notion that
Highlanders were suited for combat on difficult terrain, and the disposition of Highland
regiments during battle concurs with this theory. 160
The opinion of English officers and politicians on Highlanders and their incorporation in
the British army was critical for this period in the wake of the last Jacobite uprising in 1745. The
passing of the Proscription Act of 1746 allowed for influential English politicians to tempt the
Highlanders who wanted to retain important cultural symbols to join the armed services. This
relieved the English who feared another Jacobite rebellion. Some high-ranking English officers
and politicians, however, held the Highlanders in contempt. Officers such as James Wolfe had
such disdain for Highlanders that he went so far as to call for their use as cannon fodder. The
Duke of Richmond advised his brother, an officer in the British army, to avoid socializing with
any Scots he might encounter.
Scholars who study this topic have done tremendous work in re-interpreting the role and
impact of Scots in the British army in the wake of the ’Forty-Five. Their works, aided by the
utilization of new sources as a result of extensive archival research, significantly enhanced what
is known of the Scots, particularly Highlanders, during this time. The Highlanders encountered
more trials and tribulations than what is represented above, especially fighting the French on
Guadeloupe. The analytical framework outlined above will offer scholars a more useful
framework to see how Highland and Lowland Scots participated in the expansion and
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consolidation of the British Empire. Recent scholarship discusses only a small part of this, and
there is ample room for further research. This framework will now be used to explain in the next
chapter how English army officers and government officials employed Scottish Highlanders in
the colony of Georgia allies during the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1748).
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CHAPTER 3: SCOTTISH HIGHLANDERS DURING
THE WAR OF JENKINS’ EAR
The security of the southern frontier of British-occupied territory in North America was a
key component of stability for the British in the region. South Carolina militia and regular British
military units bore the brunt of this initiative in the first two decades of the eighteenth century,
completing a vicious three-year war with the Yemassee in 1728. 161 Skirmishes with the
Yemassee and other Native American communities, as well as the Spanish, cost the South
Carolinians financially and in manpower. According to Larry Ivers, the establishment of the
colony of Georgia allayed the fears of South Carolinians on the possible destruction of their
colony; it would “absorb the bloody raids” of the Spanish and their allies. 162 Within a decade of
its establishment as a chartered colony in 1733, Georgia and its inhabitants found themselves at
war with a potentially destructive enemy just beyond its southern border. It was now up to the
colonists of Georgia, a large part of them recruited from the Scottish Highlands, to patrol and
defend the southern extent of British-controlled land in North America. 163
There was an intense rivalry between Great Britain and Spain during the early eighteenth
century. Each side had grievances against the other, including British dominance over formers
Spanish possessions such as Gibraltar and Minorca, British and Spanish privateers hampering the
other country’s imperial trade, and, more recently, the border between British Georgia and
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Spanish Florida. 164 Throughout the later-1720s and 1730s, Britain and Spain were locked in
fierce negotiations over commercial trade and land rights in the Americas, aspects that, as
H.W.V. Temperley argued, could threaten war. 165 What finally drove the two countries to
declare war in 1739 not only included the failure of the British and Spanish diplomats to fully
comply with the demands of the other country, but the threat of foreign intervention by France
resulting in a grand Bourbon alliance between Spain and France, a partnership that drove even
the most anti-war British politicians to change their mind.
Early in the 1730s, British diplomats met with their Spanish counterparts to negotiate a
settlement in the numerous disputes each country had against the other. One of the main qualms
between the two countries concerned trade, which was being hampered by Spanish and British
privateers, in addition to the extra-legal trade involving British merchants in Spanish colonies.166
With the British colonization of Georgia, there was a growing concern amongst the Spanish
about the security of her possessions in southern North America and the Caribbean. Even the
Duke of Newcastle, an agitator throughout the process of negotiations, had doubts about the
legitimacy of British claims to Georgia. 167 Neither side wanted to go to war, and yet diplomats
and politicians in Great Britain and Spain were not willing to back down from their demands of
the other country. 168
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Amongst the British who desired peace, none was more vocal than Sir Robert Walpole,
then First Lord of the Treasury. Walpole equated peace with better trade and a booming
economy, arguing these points even when war with Spain seemed inevitable. 169 Throughout the
1720s and 1730s Britain, and particularly Spain, desired to increase the amount of trade flowing
between the metropole and the colonies. 170 There were pressing arguments for a war where
British victory meant a more liberal sea passage for British ships and increased access to raw
materials in the Americas and Caribbean. 171 Despite the growing clamor for war, both sides
began to back down from their bellicose statements, and between January and early March 1739,
preparations for war came to a halt.172
Negotiations broke down again for the last time in May 1739 when Spain refused to
repay reparations to the British merchant group South Sea Company, not to mention a British
fleet, recalled when relations were favorable between Spain and Britain in January, put to sea
again on March 10. 173 In addition to payment and land grievances, the threat of a pacte de
famille of the French and Spanish Bourbon monarchies led even those staunchly opposed to war
like Walpole to consider action before this threat could materialize. 174 Hostilities began in June
and July, with war formally declared on October 23, 1739. 175 One of the first theaters of the war
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developed over the boundary dispute on what constituted British and Spanish territory along the
southeastern coast of North America.
The formation of Georgia may be looked at within the context of the framework
established in the previous chapter, where the Highlanders who participated in security
operations and outright warfare on the Georgia-Florida border in the decades before receiving
the status of a royal colony did so according to how the English perceived the Highlanders
should be used in combat. A key purpose in the establishment of Georgia was that it would be a
militarized colony; the colonists, males in this case, would serve as yeomen farmers (slavery was
forbidden at this time), and maintain patrols against incursions from beyond the western and
southern borders of Georgia. 176 In the first two years of Georgia’s existence, the trustees of the
colony, almost all of them English, developed a system of defense that incorporated Yamacraw
allies, rangers and boatmen from South Carolina, and Highland rangers and militia from Georgia,
the latter two units led by Captain John Mackintosh. 177 The original defense system developed
by South Carolina was manned by no more than one hundred men, and served as a reference for
how the trustees would set up the defensive system for Georgia in the 1730s. 178
Another component of the militarization of Georgia was building militarized positions
along the Altamaha River. James Oglethorpe, a member of the Board of Trustees for the
establishment of Georgia, was able to raise ₤26,000 from Parliament for his scheme, approved
by the trustees, of constructing two fortified towns along the Altamaha River, one occupied by
Scottish Highlanders and the other by a mix of English and Salzburger colonists. 179 The 138
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Highlanders recruited by Georgia trustees embarked from Scotland in October 1735 and arrived
in Georgia in January 1736 to settle the garrison of New Inverness, later renamed Darien. 180
Once in Georgia, the Highlanders received a broadsword, target, and, perhaps as a sign of
decreasing government expenditures, a “poorly-manufactured musket.” 181 According to the
South Carolinians, Georgia and its inhabitants were to relieve the South Carolinians from the
burdens of frontier guerilla-style warfare that had plagued the colony since the first decade of the
eighteenth century. If the Georgians were to achieve any success against Britain’s enemies in
North America, they should have been supplied with proper equipment. Instead, it appears the
Highlanders were to rely more on their broadswords and targets, which complied with the
English stereotypical view at the time of the Highland warrior brandishing his broadsword and
conducting unconventional warfare against conventional foes.
During the first three years after the founding of Highland settlements along the
Altamaha River, the inhabitants were under a near constant state of military preparedness. In his
first visit to Darien in February 1736, James Oglethorpe inspected the town where the
Highlanders turned out in their plaid uniforms with complete military kit. 182 The display, of
which Oglethorpe commented the Highlanders made a “manly appearance,” only reinforced his
and the Trustees’ views on the use of Highlanders as perhaps the only reliable defense on the
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border with Spanish Florida. 183 The Trustees themselves placed the Highlanders under strict
living conditions which interfered with how the Highlanders desired to run their settlements,
which included the restriction of slave labor.184 By April 1736 two forts had been built under
Oglethorpe’s direction, one on Saint Simon’s Island with an English garrison, the other on
Cumberland Island with a Highland garrison. 185 It is interesting to note the Highland fort on
Cumberland Island was situated far closer to the border with Spanish Florida than the fort on
Saint Simon’s Island, a linear distance of about twenty miles between the two fortifications.
Whether this was intentional or not, the fact that the Highlanders built and manned the southernmost fort clearly demonstrates the intentions of the Trustees, specifically Oglethorpe. The
Highlanders were to position themselves at a point where their supposed inherited natural
fighting capabilities were to be used in conducting guerilla operations as well as manning
troublesome frontier defensive positions. 186
Another fort, Fort Saint George, was rebuilt in September 1736 in northeastern Spanish
Florida, near modern Mount Cornelia. 187 Fort Saint George was manned by Ensign Hugh
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Mackay, Jr. and Highland militia to alleviate the burden of constant vigilance on the frontier by
other troops. 188 The following year, Highland militia from Darien under the command of
Lieutenant John Mackintosh finished the project and began the detested process of patrolling the
frontier for signs of the enemy. After weeks spent in a constant state of alert for Spanish raiding
parties, the Highlanders were contemptuous of life on the frontier. 189 The families of the
militiamen sent to the forts in southeast Georgia and Spanish Florida also suffered as a result of
the prolonged absence of a majority of the labor force. The supplies given to Darien by the
Trustees, meant only to last a year until the settlement became self-sufficient, were supplemented
for an additional three years due to the lack of manpower in the town. 190 By the end of 1737 the
only rangers that maintained patrols on the border were the Highland Rangers led by Ensign
Hugh Mackay, Jr., as the others had been recalled for various duties in South Carolina. 191
Throughout 1737 the fledgling colony of Georgia braced for an invasion from the
Spanish and her allies in Florida. 192 The Spanish never launched a full scale invasion, but sent
raiding parties in the spring and summer of that year which alarmed the local populace as well as
the Trustees. 193 Highlanders stationed on Amelia Island fought off one such incursion of thirty
Spaniards; the garrison remained “in a constant state of alarm” until the threat ended later that
year. 194 Oglethorpe sought immediate assistance from Parliament, and consulted with First Lord
of the Treasury Sir Robert Walpole on procuring British regular units for the defense of
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Georgia. 195 Walpole remained cautious on sending regular troops to defend the frontier in
Georgia, but finally consented to Oglethorpe’s request. 196 He agreed to the dispatch of a
regiment, the Forty-Second Regiment of Foot, to Georgia. Walpole’s hesitation on whether any
British military personnel should be stationed on the southern frontier conformed with his
peaceful endeavors throughout much of the 1730s to avoid a major war with Spain. However, as
colonist Hugh Anderson made clear to James Oglethorpe, the deployment of only the FortySecond Regiment of Foot “would little suffice to withstand the enemy,” and that in the near
future posed a danger to the Trustees as the regulars might mutiny against the conditions
imposed upon them. 197
In November 1737, the governor of Spanish Florida, Manuel de Montaino informed the
governor of Cuba about the intentions of the British in regards to a possible invasion of Florida
that were presented to the British Parliament by Governor Oglethorpe. 198 He was certain that
Spanish Florida was susceptible to invasion, and that the British would do so before the decade
was out. Montaino commented that the British, in his opinion, would attempt to conquer Spanish
Florida because the area was “more useful to Great Britain than all its remaining Colonies and
Islands in America.” 199 Thus, the Highlanders stationed at the extremities of British territory in
North America were to provide a strong, militarized colony as a base of operations against the
Spanish and her allies in Florida. As will be demonstrated, the Highlanders, in part due to the
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preference of the British government to rely on provincial troops to secure colonial investments,
were used specifically for raid and counter-raid actions in Florida, a duty the Highlanders were
thought particularly capable of handling given the apparent extensive training in guerilla warfare
tactics in the Highlands demonstrated during the ’Fifteen Rebellion.
Conditions continued to deteriorate in Georgia as the year 1738 brought more hardships
to the Highland colonists. A poor harvest the previous year led the Highlanders to discuss open
revolt against the Trustees if the Highlanders did not have their demands met. 200 The elite
amongst the Highlanders, particularly those with better education, provided the voice for all
Highland colonists in setting before the Trustees their concerns over the present disposition of
the colony. 201 Oglethorpe, now the commander of all forces in defense of the southern frontier of
British-occupied territory in North America, demonstrated his power over the colonists when he
exercised his authority, backed by the other Trustees, in quelling the rebellious Highlanders. 202
Discontent amongst colonists reached a climax in November when forces stationed at Fort Saint
Andrews mutinied over the extreme situations they faced on a daily basis; Highland militia units
were sent to quell the uprising and restore order to the area. 203
The first half of 1739 saw a flurry of diplomatic activity between the Spanish and British
over the possibility of war between the two countries. One of the main factors in the cries for war
on both sides was the establishment of Georgia and its purpose as a military buffer against the
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Spanish in Florida. 204 In June, Great Britain and Spain agreed to halt all efforts in their respective
military build-up operations; Oglethorpe had other intentions. 205 In early July, Oglethorpe
gathered a force of nearly thirty men, composed almost entirely of Highlanders, and led a
reconnaissance expedition into the activity of Spanish forces in Florida. 206 This endeavor was
successful in proving the Spanish continued to gather men and matériel after the agreement
between Spain and Great Britain was signed and in securing alliances between Native American
communities and the British. In late September a message from King George II reached
Oglethorpe in Georgia that the uneasy peace with Spain had deteriorated, and that Oglethorpe
was to “annoy the Subjects of Spain” in any manner he sought fit. 207 This order, coupled with
Oglethorpe’s choice of Highlanders to accompany him in his expedition into Florida in early
1740, demonstrates the mindset of the English on how the Highlanders should be best used to
fully utilize them for their martial capabilities. The Highlanders, apparent experts on hit-and-run
tactics necessary for movement through enemy territory in Spanish Florida and for the manner in
which King George II desired to harass the Spanish in the two months before war broke out in
October, were to be a significant feature throughout the war between Spain and Britain. 208
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Outbreak of War

The necessity of having a force to use in patrolling and security operations along the
southern frontier became even greater after October 1739. On the twenty-third of that month, war
was officially declared between Spain and Great Britain; preparations began almost immediately
when word of this reached Georgia. 209 Oglethorpe appeared to have become tremendously
excited over the declaration of hostilities between the British and Spanish, a fact not entirely
unexpected given his past with the militarization of Georgia. 210 One of the first major actions
occurred in mid-November 1739 and involved, not surprisingly, Highland militia units. In the
early hours of November 13, the garrison on Amelia Island, consisting of sixteen Highlanders,
twelve regulars from the Forty-Second Regiment, and a handful of women and children were
startled by an ambush of a dozen Yemassee warriors allied with the Spanish. 211 Two unarmed
Highland guards were killed, the sole casualties in the attack. 212 Their deaths were the result of
the defensive measures enacted by Oglethorpe and the Trustees to use the supposed inherent
martial capabilities of the Highlanders on the southern frontier of British-occupied North
America.

209

Robert Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727 to 1783, vol. 1 (London: J. Chalmers
and Co. Printers, 1804), 33, 42; Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 75.
210
Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, 71. It is noted here that Oglethorpe was “full of the most
sanguine expectations” for a successful campaign against Spain, and that most of his forces would come from
Georgia.
211
Letter of James Oglethorpe to the Duke of Newcastle, November 15, 1739, CRSG, vol. 35, 229; William
Stephens, journal entry of November 22, 1739, in Allen D. Candler, et. al., ed., The Colonial Records of the State of
Georgia, vol. IV, Stephens’s Journal (Atlanta: The Franklin Printing and Publishing Company, 1906), 456-458;
Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Georgia, 75.
212
Letter of James Oglethorpe to the Trustees, November 16, 1739 in Lane, General Oglethorpe’s Georgia, vol. 2,
420-421; Ivers, British Drums Along the Southern Frontier, 90.

64

Shortly after the raid on Amelia Island, Oglethorpe collected a force consisting of nearly
two hundred militia, regular troops, mounted rangers (including the newly-formed Troop of
Highland Rangers raised from the Highland garrison at Amelia Island less than a week after the
ambush there), and allied Native Americans for an excursion into Spanish Florida. 213 These
soldiers were to conduct unconventional warfare against the Spanish and her allies, and gather
intelligence on the strength and size of the enemy in Florida. 214 The British, under General James
Oglethorpe, operated under the orders presented to them by King George II: to harass the enemy
wherever found. This allowed Oglethorpe to deploy his men, specifically the Highland infantry
and mounted rangers, into extreme combat situations where they were constantly thrust onto the
front line of most engagements in order to please the English military and political leaders who
misappropriated them for their supposed natural fighting prowess.
Darien was drained of manpower for the British invasion of Spanish Florida in 1740. The
removal of the men from the Highland communities, particularly at Darien, put a tremendous
strain on the families they left behind, and threatened their existence in Georgia. 215 Highlanders
not already under arms in a ranger detachment or militia companies were hastily assigned to
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units created especially for the expedition. 216 Those that did serve wore the traditional uniforms
and equipage of the average Highland soldier: tartans, muskets, broadswords and target. 217 The
mounted rangers employed similar items, but made more use of dirks and claymores; they
transitioned to English-style clothing later in the campaign. 218 Whether by choice or not, the
Highlanders initially went into battle armed and clothed in the fashion known to the English to
be the standard look of the Highland soldier, but ill-suited for the inhospitable conditions in
southern Georgia and northern Florida.
The first major encounters of the war occurred in January 1740, when elements of the
British and Spanish forces clashed at Fort Picolata and Fort Pupo. 219 At both locations, the
Highland Rangers and Chickasaw, Uchee and Creek warriors played major roles in procuring
victories for the British. At Fort Picolata, these men launched a surprise night assault that carried
the garrison within a couple hours. 220 At Fort Pupo, Ensign Hugh Mackay, Jr. and his Highland
Rangers once again were at the forefront of the battle, this time acting as a diversion while
elements of the Forty-Second Regiment positioned artillery pieces to bombard the fort. 221 After a
day-long struggle, the garrison at Fort Pupo surrendered. This action, according to Ivers, was an
“effective harassment” of the Spanish forces. 222 The Highland Rangers, who played a crucial
role in these two battles, became the image of how the military and political leaders in Great
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Britain, as well as the Board of Trustees for the establishment of Georgia, desired to conduct
military operations against the Spanish. While British forces, whether regulars or provincials,
had a history in fighting in difficult terrain and unfavorable conditions, the extreme recurring
conditions the Highland militia and rangers faced, such as nearly-impassable swamps and
marshes, unbearable heat and humidity during the spring and summer months (in addition to
bitter cold in the winter), and swarms of insects and other potentially dangerous wildlife, not to
mention a constant state of alarm for counter-raid operations by the Spanish and their Native
American allies, one sees that these men were placed into some of the most hazardous situations
possible during this war. 223
The Highland Rangers and Highland Independent Company continued to suffer as the
campaign wore on. In early May 1740, Lieutenant Robert McPherson of the Highland Rangers
patrolled the area around Darien, searching for any signs of the enemy and waiting on promised
reinforcements from South Carolina that would never arrive. 224 A few weeks later, elements of
the Highland Independent Company and the Forty-Second Regiment, composed more of
Highlanders, were ambushed by a party of Yemassee warriors while on a supply run for British
troops occupying Fort Diego. 225 General Oglethorpe desired to use the Highland Independent
Company extensively when on reconnoitering movements in Florida. For example, Oglethorpe
deployed nearly five hundred men in his attempt to secure Fort Diego from a possible attack by
the Spanish. The force stopped just short of the fort; General Oglethorpe decided to press on with
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a guard provided by the Highland Independent Company. 226 They soon discovered that the raid
was a false alarm, and that Fort Diego was in no immediate danger. While on one particular
scouting mission, Oglethorpe, along with commanders of some of the detachments under his
command and accompanied by soldiers from the Highland Independent Company and Britishallied Indians, gathered intelligence from Point Quartell, a distance from Saint Augustine of just
over a mile. 227 Oglethorpe and the officers were on horseback, and rode at such a fast pace that
the Indians had enough and left, while the Highlanders continued to maintain contact with the
mounted officers through stifling heat and difficult sandy beaches. 228 The next major
engagement at Fort Mosa would cost the Highlanders dearly and place the entire British invasion
in jeopardy.

Ambush at Fort Mosa

While General Oglethorpe planned his siege of Saint Augustine, he ordered a “flying
column” of Highlanders (infantry and rangers), a company from the regiment sent by South
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Carolina, and allied Indians to deploy and occupy Fort Mosa, a position within two miles of
Saint Augustine on June 10; the majority of the force was composed of Highlanders.229 From the
beginning, there was a rift in relations between those from the Anglicized colony of South
Carolina and those from the predominantly-Scottish colony of Georgia. Colonel William Palmer,
commander of the South Carolinians, fought almost constantly with John Mohr Mackintosh and
Hugh Mackay, commanders of the detachments from the Highland Independent Company and
Highland Rangers and his ranking seniors. 230 One of the first disputes the commanders had with
each other was the positioning of troops at the fort. Palmer wanted the force to set up camp
outside the fort so that in the event of an attack, Palmer could deploy his men in a manner
advantageous to him. 231 Mackintosh and Mackay preferred to billet their men inside the old fort,
and began immediate preparations to do so, while Palmer went off into the adjacent woods and
set up camp with his South Carolinians. 232
Another issue arose regarding the posting of sentries once the force had settled in. The
result of this was inadequate security of the entire area, an important factor in the disaster about
to befall the flying column. 233 The Highlanders began to distrust the English and only took
commands from Highland officers. 234 Palmer feared that Oglethorpe had sent the force to Fort
Mosa as a “sacrifice”; if anyone would be sacrificed, it was the Highlanders due to the fact that
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the majority of the men present were of Scottish Highland origin. 235 The in-fighting continued as
Palmer desired to beat to arms at four in the morning daily, a routine detested by the Highland
militiamen occupying the fort. 236 Colonel Palmer went into the fort when no movement was seen
“sometimes twice…to rouse the Men up, but they little regarded it.” 237 Tensions were high
throughout the first days the flying column bivouacked at Fort Mosa, and continued when the
Spanish made their attack.
In the early morning hours of June 15 word reached Palmer and his English Rangers that
an enemy raiding party was approaching their position. 238 Palmer attempted to rouse the
Highlanders inside the fort, and encountered the usual difficulty in doing so. When Spanish
troops became visible, an order was issued not to fire until ordered so; it was disregarded by
Highland sentries posted around the fort. 239 The Spanish forces split and attacked the fort from
different sides, but the Highlanders inside and the English Rangers from without repulsed the
Spanish. 240 The position of the English Rangers was the safer of the moment, as the Spanish and
their allies desired only to breach the walls of the fort. 241 Shortly before daybreak, however, the
Spanish concentrated their efforts and were able to clear the main gate. 242 The British forces
inside did their best to fight their way out of the fort; one report, however, claims several of the
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officers and men from the Forty-Second Regiment and detachment of the company sent from
South Carolina fled as the battle was just beginning. 243
The British force incurred a severe number of casualties while defending Fort Mosa. Of
the Highlanders involved in the action, over half were killed or captured, the highest number of
casualties amongst the different detachments amalgamated into the flying column. 244 The
devastating loss of life at Fort Mosa proved the most difficult for the Highland settlements in
Georgia, particularly the severely-depopulated Darien. 245 One colonist wrote he had no news to
report other than “the number of widows are much increased at Darien by their husbands being
killed or taken at the late expedition.” 246 The incident at Fort Mosa and the resulting failed siege
of St. Augustine forced General Oglethorpe to end the offensive operation against the Spanish
and retire back into Georgia. 247
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Tense Tranquility

Much of time between the end of the British invasion of Spanish Florida and the Spanish
offensive into Georgia in mid-1742 was spent placing blame on what caused such a dramatic
failure. Many, including Oglethorpe himself, thought that if Oglethorpe was given more troops
and allowed to carry out a proper siege of Saint Augustine, the British would have had no
problem in taking all of Spanish Florida. 248 In an accurate assessment of Oglethorpe’s character,
Larry Ivers judged that Oglethorpe was ready to press his attack to Cuba if Parliament allowed
him to do so. 249 The most surprising assessment of the investigations that followed the failed
invasion of Spanish Florida came from a committee designated within the Commons House of
Assembly in South Carolina. Their conclusions lay the blame of defeat with General Oglethorpe,
where the committee thought it foolish to dispatch a relatively small number of men with limited
provisions and no reinforcements to garrison a strategic fort (Fort Mosa), while possibly giving
up their location by sending small parties out to round up stray horses from the Spanish. 250
A mutual animosity formed between members of the South Carolina Assembly and
Oglethorpe. South Carolinians were furious over the bungled invasion, and demanded the return
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of ₤2,000 loaned to Oglethorpe and promised no aid in future operations against the Spanish. 251
Less intense feelings were shared between Parliament and the Board of Trustees for the
establishment of Georgia. An officer in the provincial militia, Lieutenant William Horton,
begged Parliament for additional money and regular soldiers for the defense of the colony;
Parliament ignored the request, yet agreed to it after the invasion was over. 252 At the time, the
British government attempted to scale back expenditures on defensive measures in Georgia and
appropriated more funds to the escalating conflict in Europe. Perhaps Parliament was correct in
its decision to allocate more funds for the forces on the Continent than in Georgia. However,
Georgia was still essential for guarding the rest of the British colonies in North America, and
served as a staging area for British incursions into Spanish Florida.
The cessation of major hostilities between Georgia and Florida between late-1740 and
early-1742 allowed the trustees to rebuild Georgia. In April 1741 the Board of Trustees began
another recruiting campaign in Scotland to acquire new colonists to replace those lost during the
invasion into Florida and improve the local economy. 253 Anthony Parker noted that the new
wave of colonists, forty in all including twenty-five men, were to be used specifically for martial
purposes, as they were outfitted with “a ‘Musquet’…flints, bullets, gunpowder, and cleaning
supplies.” 254 Between the arrival of the new Highland Gaels and the resuming of hostilities the
following year, the colonists participated in the maintenance of fortifications along the southern
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frontier, as well as training for possible future fighting with the Spanish. This allowed them to
become accustomed to the military efforts required of those involved in the military campaigns
in this theater of the War of the Austrian Succession.
Oglethorpe, after recovering from the disastrous campaign, set out to bolster the defense
of Georgia. Once again, the Highlanders would be at the heart of security operations where boats
piloted by one hundred men of the Highland Independent Company, as well as two troops of
rangers, became a crucial force in patrolling the southern frontier. 255 Despite an unsteady
economy to support his military endeavors, Oglethorpe necessitated the deployment of troops on
the frontiers, and made use of the new wave of colonists for this purpose. 256 The Highlanders, by
Oglethorpe’s design, were to maintain a constant patrol of the border with Spanish Florida. This
was proven detrimental to those Highlanders ordered to do so prior to the declaration of war in
1739. The Highland militia units and ranger troops stationed in garrisons on the southern frontier
during that time quickly became exhausted, and in certain cases mutinous, due to constant
patrols, incessant alarms, lack of supplies, and poor living conditions. The situation was the same
in May 1742, when Oglethorpe assessed that Darien was in good condition despite some
grievances amongst the colonists. 257 These were in regards to how the Highlanders in Darien and
colonists in other towns were kept on the alert for Spanish incursions, as well as enduring attacks
by Spanish who managed to slip past the security net.
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The Spanish Invasion of Georgia

In late October 1741 the Spanish began to develop a planned invasion of their own, under
the control of the governor of Cuba Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas and commanded by
the governor of Spanish Florida Manuel de Montiano. 258 Once assembled, the Spanish fleet
sailed for Georgia in mid-June 1742. The forces of Georgia and South Carolina were still
reorganizing after their defeat in 1740, and relations between Oglethorpe and the South
Carolinians had not fully improved. Prior to the sailing of the Spanish fleet, Oglethorpe had less
than one thousand men at his command, with most of them dispersed amongst several outposts
along the border with Spanish Florida, to defend against a Spanish force of 2,000 to 3,000
men. 259 An order was received in Darien for the immediate dispatch of the Highland Independent
Company to assemble in Saint Simons Sound, the eventual landing place of the Spanish invasion
force. 260 As the Spanish fleet approached, they attempted to pass through and land the soldiers
on Amelia Island, but British artillery firing from Fort William prevented this. 261 Governor
Montiano then chose a spot just over a mile from Fort Saint Simons, and disembarked his force
there on the evening of July 5. 262
Oglethorpe quickly gathered a guard of men from, not surprisingly, the Highland
Independent Company, rangers, and allied Indians and began to scout the Spanish positions. 263
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Montiano had to move fast if he was to retain the initiative and achieve victory against the
British opposing forces around him. He moved much of his men out of the landing area and
began searching for the large British formation thought to be in the vicinity. The Spanish spent
most of July 6 occupied in establishing their beachhead and launching patrols to locate the
British. Oglethorpe chose to deploy his forces in the woods surrounding the Spanish positions, a
tactic he thought necessary to keep the Spanish from forming ranks in open fields and fighting
pitched battles. 264 This strategy became important as the British prepared to strike the following
day.
On the morning of July 7, word of movement by enemy forces prompted Oglethorpe to
gather troops in the immediate area to halt the Spanish advance “in the defiles of the woods
before they could…form in the open grounds.” 265 The majority of his force consisted of rangers,
a few allied Indians, a company from the Forty-Second Regiment, and the Highland Independent
Company. 266 The Highlanders were the only ones ready to move out at the time, and were
immediately deployed in the woods to monitor the Spanish. 267 During the first part of the battle,
Oglethorpe led a charge of the Indians and Highlanders against the Spanish as they moved closer
to the woods. 268 The attack forced the Spanish to retreat with the British in close pursuit. The
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Spaniards, accompanied by around two hundred grenadiers, regrouped and marched down a
small road surrounded by woods, wary of another attack by the British forces.269 The order to
open fire was given as the Spanish grenadiers approached the British who were hidden behind
piles of logs and thick brush. 270 The Spanish returned a disciplined fire, and soon units of the
British command, almost exclusively those from the Forty-Second Regiment, began to fall
back. 271 The Highlanders, however, held their position despite the fact that they were in a
position to be outflanked once the English soldiers of the Forty-Second led by Captain Raymond
Demere fled, in part because of the conditions on the battlefield (dense wooded terrain and thick
smoke from the firefight) allowed for such confusion to occur. 272 The British position held with
only the company of Highlanders under the command of Lieutenant Charles Mackay along with
the single remaining platoon of fifteen men from the Forty-Second Regiment.273 The fierce
firefight continued for about an hour before the Spanish retreated back to their camp, the British
following closely behind. Oglethorpe desired to annihilate the Spanish before they could board
their ships in Saint Simon’s Sound. On July 12, he gathered the Highland Independent Company
along with elements of the Fort-Second Regiment and rangers and prepared to attack, yet before
meet the Spanish in battle. If the Spanish were able to form their ranks in the open, the Highlanders would be, in the
opinion of the English, more susceptible to defeat. However, one must consider if Oglethorpe consciously or
subconsciously used the Highlanders because of their inherited expert martial abilities when ordered to deploy into
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the assault commenced, a stray shot from one of Oglethorpe’s men alerted the Spanish and cost
the British the element of surprise. 274
The victory at what became known as the Battle of Bloody Marsh effectively ended the
Spanish invasion of Georgia and turned the tide of the war in favor of the British. 275 Credit for
the triumph over the Spanish was and is given to Oglethorpe by leading contemporary figures
and modern historians alike. 276 While European soldiers of this period needed officers to lead
them, to dispense orders and maintain cohesion in the chaos of combat, the true victor of the
battle, the common soldier, is lost. In this case, the efforts of Oglethorpe are lauded more than
those of the Highlanders who held the Spanish at bay from overtaking the British position.
Recent scholarship, such as the work compiled by Anthony Parker on the settlement of Darien,
begins to place the credit for the British triumph with the common soldier, specifically the
Highlanders from said settlement.
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Conclusion of the War

The Spanish invasion of Georgia was the last major event of the War of Jenkins’ Ear:
threats of similar attacks were issued by both sides, but nothing materialized from them. 277
Frequent skirmishes between British and Spanish forces in the south and French to the west and
southwest occurred that kept the civilian population on the alert for the duration of the war. 278 In
March 1743, General Oglethorpe led an expedition against the Spanish at Saint Augustine, but
failed to achieve success due to detrimental weather and severe ailments amongst the soldiers. 279
As always, the Highlanders of the Highland Independent Company and ranger troops played a
crucial role in the defense of the colony. 280 After some time, however, the Highland Independent
Company could only muster half its necessary strength due to a lack of willing participants
amongst the Highland population and few new colonists to Georgia. 281 This was supplemented in
late 1743 with the arrival of thirty Highlanders of the nascent Royal Highland Regiment of Foot
(The Black Watch). 282 When the ’Forty-Five Rebellion broke out in the Scottish Highlands, the
business of patrolling the southern frontier of British territory in North America occupied most
of the colonists’ time and efforts. 283
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In mid-1747, after much deliberation, the War Office in London decided to disband the
Highland Independent Company, most of the ranger troops, and nearly all sailors who monitored
the numerous streams and waterways in Georgia and northern Spanish Florida, an act that
stunned the colonists who perpetually feared another Spanish incursion. 284 This action placed the
Georgians, as well as South Carolinians, in a difficult position, as they did not have enough men
and resources to maintain a proper defensive posture on their borders with the Spanish and
French. Without adequate troops to guard the frontier, a good portion of British territory in
southern North America was in jeopardy. What had once been an overwhelmingly militarized
colony was reduced to a few ranger and militia units to fight against the stronger Spanish forces
and their Native American allies. Fortunately for the Highlanders, peace was declared between
Spain and Great Britain the following year in October 1748, and soon after became a royal
colony. 285 It was the first time since early 1736 that the Highlanders could live at ease and not
worry about the possible threat of invasion or fight off the Spanish or their allies in one of the
numerous skirmishes that occurred during the War of Jenkins’ Ear.
The time when Georgia was a militarized border between British territory in North
America and Spanish Florida took its toll on the Highlanders who participated in defending the
frontier. The stress of maintaining a constant defensive posture and absorbing the impact of raids
and other unconventional attacks by the Spanish and allied Indians had a severe detrimental
affect of the progress of the colony itself, particularly its struggling economy. The Highland
colonists voiced their concerns over their deplorable living conditions, where more time was
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devoted to security operations on the border with Florida than farming. Several Highland
colonists left Georgia for the relative safety of South Carolina, or returned to the Scottish
Highlands to take part in the ’Forty-Five or post-’Forty-Five peace initiatives. 286 What the
Highlanders faced in Georgia was what the English thought the Highlanders were exposed to in
the supposed wild and uncivilized country of the Scottish Highlands. 287 According to English
stereotypical opinions, the Highlanders were natural warriors suited for the type of
unconventional warfare experienced during the War of Jenkins’ Ear in Georgia and Florida, a
possible indication of the effects the ’Fifteen had on the martial identity of the Scots Gaels when
armed insurrection was associated with the Scottish Highlands.
The Highlanders saw much action, whether manning garrisons near Spanish-occupied
territory or on the battlefield, while deployed during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Governor James
Oglethorpe, commander of all British forces, made frequent use of the Highland Independent
Company and Highland Rangers, including similar militia units gathered from communities in
central and southern Georgia. Military service proved necessary for provincial units and those
enlisted in the regular forces if the British were to solidify their position in North America,
including the southern border with Spanish Florida, and those Highland colonists that served in
the militia units lived up to their original designation as militarized yeomen.
As demonstrated with this case study, the experience of Scottish Highlanders who served
in defense of the southern frontier of British-occupied land in North America fits the framework
established in the previous chapter of how Highlanders were utilized for their inherent martial
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abilities in the defense and expansion of the British Empire. The Highlanders recruited for
colonization efforts in Georgia were not highly-skilled warriors, a concept contrary to popular
English mythology. 288 In reality, the Highlanders had to adapt to conditions in Georgia, not only
in developing communities but on the battlefield as well, something previous colonists failed to
accomplish. This was a difficult task to overcome, as is seen in the eyewitness accounts of
civilian and military life provided by some of the Highland colonists and the Trustees and
officials in the British government. The certain instances, the Highlanders paid a heavier price
for their efforts than did their English counterparts while the British were engaged in war and
colonization in Georgia, particularly during the years of the trusteeship.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
Throughout the period of military endeavors that drew upon the manpower of the nations
of Great Britain between 1739 and 1815 to fill the ranks of the British armed forces, one
particular group, the Scottish Highlanders, were deployed in large numbers during the several
wars of this period. Indeed, the act of employing such men in disproportionate numbers for
service on the frontiers of imperial territory, combating enemy troops the Highlanders were
thought to be naturally capable of defeating in battle, demonstrates the mindset of those in the
British government and military who were desperate to remove the Jacobite threat from Britain.
This threat became a problem in relations between Scotland and England as both sides began to
negotiate a political union.
The Act of Union in 1707 not only created one British government, but effectively
established the British army, composed of men from England, Wales, Scotland, and parts of
Ireland. Sharing the experience of warfare and empire-building were, according to some
historians, key in solidifying the relationship between the nations of Great Britain. 289 Since the
restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the need for a standing Scottish army declined, in part due
to the economic strife in the country, which in turn diminished the image of Scotland as a
reservoir of men for military use. 290 There was, however, a strong demand for men to fight in
armies on continental Europe, and men from all nations in the British Isles answered the call. It
was here that Englishmen and Scotsmen fought together as mercenaries, both gaining valuable
289
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experience for the next threat to Great Britain: the House of Stewart’s attempt to reclaim the
British throne.
The Scottish Highlands, however, became a problem in the development of relations
between Scotland and England. There was mutual resentment against the Act of Union of 1707
which provided the Jacobites in Scotland and England with further cause to not only to
overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty but to restore the Scottish legislature as well. 291 The ’Fifteen
and ’Forty-Five Rebellions, violent reactions in 1715 and 1745 to the House of Hanover that
supported a restoration of the exiled Stuart dynasty, generated much disdain of the Highlanders
amongst those loyal to the Hanoverians in both countries. 292 Yet many Scots were not in favor of
restoring the Stuarts to the throne, and saw better opportunities within the union of Great Britain
under a Hanoverian monarch. 293 The Jacobite rebellions, particularly the ’Fifteen and ’FortyFive, did more to tarnish the image of all Scots, as they were contrived as militant Jacobites by
English propaganda. 294 The Scottish Highlanders had to prove their loyalty to the British
Parliament and the House of Hanover; one option was to utilize the Highlander’s supposed
natural superiority as warriors, a construct developed by the English during the uprisings in the
early- and mid-eighteenth century, to develop and secure loyalty to the British government, as
well as quelling any rebellious activity in the region. 295 Many agree that the Scottish Highlanders
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finally became integrated into the British state after participating in several global conflicts in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly after the colonization process of “Anglicizing”
the Highlands was complete. 296 However, recent scholarship seems to reject this idea, resulting
in a shift in the correct direction of where future inquiry into this topic should be focused.
Revisionist opinion on the contribution of the Scottish Highlands to the British military
deconstructs the positive outlook military service had on the Scottish Gaels and focuses on the
detrimental effects of martial life on not only the Highlanders themselves, but later images of the
Highlands (indeed, all of Scotland) and the strong Scottish nationalist identity that persisted
despite the idea of sharing a larger British identity with the rest of the British Isles. 297 The
retention of a Scottish national identity despite efforts to create one British identity is
demonstrated with the case study on Highland provincial units in the War of Jenkins’ Ear.
Instead of forging a British identity in the process of bolstering the British Empire, the subnationalities of Scotland and England are developed throughout the war. This proved dangerous
as the combined forces from South Carolina and Georgia fought off the invading Spanish forces.
Yet, service in the British military allowed the Highlanders to prove their loyalty to the British
government, in addition to having returned to them cultural objects lost after the ’Forty-Five; the
Scots Gaels, including those in the army and those at home in Scotland, paid a heavy price for
the return of such objects. Stana Nenadic argues that expanding and defending the British
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Empire had a “socially and culturally disruptive” impact on many Highland families. 298 Many
Highland officers went to great lengths to prove themselves equal to their English counterparts,
and in doing so squandered family fortunes, abandoned large estates for long periods of service
abroad, and often met an untimely death. This is applicable to what many common Highland
soldiers experienced when fighting to establish their “Britishness” and participate in “defence
patriotism.” 299
The British army incorporated significant numbers of Scottish Highlanders, nearly sixty
Highland units in all, for service at home and abroad between the Seven Years’ War and the end
of the Napoleonic Wars. 300 Scottish, particularly Highland, regiments accounted for sixteen per
cent of the total land force raised during the Seven Years’ War, not to mention Scots composing
nearly a third of the officer corps. 301 Thomas Devine wondered why so many would enlist a
decade after the violent repression of the Jacobites during and after the ’Forty-Five, arguing that
given a martial identity before the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five was almost non-existent in the
Highlands, these and other smaller insurrections in the region gave rise to this image where
“Gaeldom became even more militarized than in the past.” 302 The objective of the British
government was to eradicate all substantial threats to itself by enlisting the Highlanders in the
British army in record numbers in order to stabilize northern and eastern Scotland and utilize a
new pool of recruits thought to be experts in the type of warfare needed to consolidate the
Empire.
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Once a pattern of recruitment was established, the British government was able to drain
more manpower out of the Highlands and into service across the Empire. This was certainly the
case once a call to arms was put out during the American War of Independence and the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 303 The contribution of the Scottish Highlander to the
defense of the British Isles and its Empire allowed for their image as rebellious savages bent on
the destruction of the British state to be reformed into that of a loyal citizenry ready to be called
upon in service of their nation. As Andrew Mackillop argued, this was “the replacement of a
hostile stereotype with a positive one, but a stereotype nonetheless.” 304 The result of this was a
severely-depopulated Scottish Highlands in the nineteenth century, coming at a time when a new
wave of foreign wars threatened the stability of Britain’s overseas possessions. 305 The
development of the Scottish Highlander as a martial race thus had its origins in the bloody
conflicts between Jacobite supporters of the House of Stuart and the British government,
providing further insight into why the Highland Gaels became the stereotypical image of British
prowess in battle. However, as argued above, it was the participation of the Scottish Highlander
in the War of Jenkins’ Ear, which began a pattern of martial usage of the Scots Gaels to be
copied in the larger wars of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession, fought primarily in
British-occupied Georgia and Spanish Florida, provides an early example of Scottish Highland
participation in the British military system. The colony of Georgia was established primarily to
relieve the burden of the South Carolinians who were under pressure to maintain patrols against
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the Spanish and their allies. Within the first six years of the colony’s existence, the Georgia
colonists, in particular the Highlanders, encountered numerous difficulties not only in attempting
to establish a means of living, but in creating an effective defense system against enemy
incursions as well. The governor and overall commander of the armed forces for the defense of
Georgia, General James Oglethorpe, forced the Highlanders to make extreme sacrifices in the
early years of the colonization of Georgia. While the colonization process was by no means
meant to be easy, Oglethorpe singled out the Highlanders time and again for some of the more
difficult assignments, particularly those relating to the defensive system.
In securing the colony’s southern border, a series of fortified outposts were established
between 1736 and 1739 with many, including the southern-most fort on Cumberland Island,
defended by Highland militia units or detachments of the Highland Rangers. 306 As noted earlier,
the Highlanders were armed with inadequate muskets at first, having either to purchase better
arms or rely on their broadswords and targets. Much time and effort was spent patrolling
southern Georgia and northern Florida to identify any threats against British-occupied land. The
placement of Scottish Highland militia on the frontier of British-occupied territory in North
America concurred with doctrine of the time, where the Highlanders were thought to be
experienced in the type of unconventional warfare experienced in this part of the Empire.
When war broke out between Great Britain and Spain in late-1739, Georgia was put on
full alert in anticipation of larger raids by the Spanish. To counter this, Oglethorpe conducted his
own incursions into Spanish Florida, with the Highland militia and ranger units at the forefront.
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Indeed, the first casualties after the official commencement of hostilities were two unarmed
Highland militiamen stationed on Amelia Island. Within the first two months of 1740,
Oglethorpe gathered an army composed of provincial units from South Carolina and Georgia, as
well as the recently-arrived regular Forty-Second Regiment, and led an expedition to capture the
heart of Spanish rule in Florida, St. Augustine. The Highlanders became a bodyguard for
Oglethorpe, who surrounded himself with them when scouting possible enemy positions. One
Highlander died of exhaustion as he and other Highlanders and allied Indians tried to keep up
with the mounted general and his entourage when observing the Spanish in the Castillo de San
Marcos.
The rout of British forces at Fort Mosa was the turning point of the invasion of Florida by
General Oglethorpe. The “flying column” sent by Oglethorpe to this fort, a mere two miles from
the main Spanish positions in St. Augustine, became embroiled in internal fighting amongst the
officers in command. Arguments raged on issues such as overall command and where to bivouac
the troops to provide maximum protection for the force. Highlanders Hugh Mackay and John
Mackintosh, senior in rank to the Englishman William Palmer of South Carolina, wanted the
column to establish a base within the fort, while Palmer preferred the open country, where the
troops could form quickly in case of attack. Palmer also wanted to capture loose Spanish horses
in the vicinity, an act that ultimately gave away their positions to observers in St. Augustine. 307
Prior to and after the defeat of the force by an early-morning attack conducted by the Spanish
and their allied Indian forces a rift in relations had developed between the English South
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Carolinian officers and the Highland officers of Georgia, which trickled down to the Highland
militia who refused to follow orders from Colonel Palmer. This mutual distrust appears to go
beyond one of opposing plans or squabbling amongst the officers, and conforms to the reality of
Anglo-Scottish, especially Anglo-Highland, relations unfolding in Great Britain. While the
column suffered needlessly due to poor coordination from General Oglethorpe, the presence of
so many Highlanders must be seen as an attempt by Oglethorpe to deploy the Highlanders in a
complicated reconnaissance mission as a way of utilizing their supposed superiority at
conducting such operations.
When heavy fighting flared up in mid-1742, the Highlanders were once again put into a
position where Oglethorpe took full advantage of their misunderstood martial capabilities. The
Spanish invasion force that landed in Georgia met determined resistance from all British troops
in the area. On July 6, General Oglethorpe led a party of Highlanders, regulars from the FortySecond Regiment, and Indians in an effort to scout the enemy positions and lure the Spanish into
the woods where the British had a better chance of achieving victory if a battle occurred. The
Highlanders played a pivotal role in defeating Spanish troops as they maneuvered through
narrow paths and difficult terrain when an intense firefight broke out in what became known as
the Battle of Bloody Marsh. Companies from the Forty-Second Regiment attached to the British
force fell back, yet the Highlanders held their ground despite mounting casualties, an act that
turned the tide of the battle in favor of the British.
The Battle of Bloody Marsh effectively ended the Spanish invasion, and while threats of
similar incursions into British territory loomed over the southern British colonies, the warring
sides chose to conduct smaller raids until the end of the war in 1748. As the war died down in the
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North American theater, Parliament chose to cut back on military spending in the southern
British colonies, particularly Georgia. This came as a shock to the colonists who feared the
Spanish would take the opportunity to conquer Georgia. While years of war took its toll on the
Highlanders in Georgia, the idea that they were now more vulnerable than ever to invasion
seemed to create a greater sense of fear amongst the colonists.308 The demobilization of the
Highland Independent Company and the Highland Rangers, two significant forces in the defense
of the southern frontier, came at a time when relations back in Great Britain were strained after
the defeat of Jacobite forces at the end of the ’Forty-Five Rebellion. While monetary issues were
deciding factors in the decision to disband these provincial forces, this should not be taken out of
the context of the Jacobite threat to the Hanoverian dynasty and all disarming acts that followed
the failed uprising in Scotland.
Given the case study presented in the third chapter, there was a period of
misrepresentation of Highland manpower in the colony of Georgia during the War of Jenkins’
Ear that conforms to the analytical framework established in the second chapter. The
Highlanders who participated in the fighting against the Spanish and their allies encountered
extreme difficulties in attempting to secure the southern border of British territory in North
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America. It was this kind of warfare, in many instances unconventional, experienced here that
the British government thought the Scots Gaels were capable of countering. This theory was
developed as a result of the failed Jacobite uprisings that occurred in the Scottish Highlands in
the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, and came to be stereotypically seen as a
movement almost exclusively composed of Highlanders determined to restore an oppressive
Catholic royal family.
This study, however, presents only one example of how Scottish Highlanders were
initially deployed in the British military system for a period of nine years. With the establishment
of a pattern of martial misappropriation, new studies may be conducted on this subject. Thomas
Devine made clear in his research the importance of further study of Scotland’s impact in the
Royal Navy in the mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries in order to fully appreciate the
role Scotland played in the expansion and defense of the British Empire at this time. 309 Steve
Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop asserted that, in terms of military service, Scots are examined
primarily in an army role; the Highlanders are exclusively examined only in this capacity
because of the iconic image of the Gaels in the army. 310 More research must be conducted at the
county level to gain sufficient knowledge of enlistment records and patterns to establish how
Scots in general participated in the British military system within the context of English use of
Scottish, specifically Highland, manpower.
Employed in this study was a technique of reading against British, particularly English,
discourse of officers and government officials on Scottish Highlanders. These sources provided a
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valuable look at English opinions of the Scots Gaels at the time, as well as a way of examining
how the Highlander reacted to military service. These sources were used in this manner due to
the lack of sufficient written material from the Highlanders, specifically those who were
involved with the colonization of Georgia, as many of them were illiterate or could converse
only in Gaelic. While the technique used here proved beneficial for this study, more archival
research and translation of Gaelic sources will enhance the understanding of the Highland
viewpoint on their contribution to the British military in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.
This study predominantly approaches the subject of the misunderstanding of the martial
capabilities of the Scottish Highlanders from the perspective of the Gaels themselves, utilizing
British government and military sources to gain insight into how the English and the Scottish
Highlanders viewed the deployment of Scots Gaels in the British army. It does not examine how
the common English or Welsh soldier experienced warfare during this period. While their views
on participating in the shared process of Britainization through warfare and defense of the
Empire are important, their opinions were left out to focus more on how the Scottish Highlander
perceived his role at this time, particularly while combating the Spanish in Georgia and Florida
during the War of the Austrian Succession. Proper comparisons must be made in order to
establish if Scots, specifically Highlanders, encountered more difficulties within the British
military system than other nationalities. Once this and the afore-mentioned studies are completed
will a stronger argument be made available to effectively counter assertions that military service
was necessary and beneficial for Highlanders in the wake of the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five to show
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loyalty to the British Parliament and monarchy as well as creating a new sense of “Britishness”
within the realm of Great Britain and the Empire.
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